Voluntariness, Responsibility and the Ethics of Abortion
Contemporary
Moral Problems, Mehl
A proposed general principle, call it the Responsibility Equals Obligation
Principle:
Whether or not a person has a moral obligation to another
person depends (in part) on how responsible that person is for the other's
dependence on him; that is, on the extent to which the other's dependency
situation is a consequence of that person's voluntary action.
Generally speaking, our moral obligation to another will be stronger
(other things being equal) in cases where we are fully responsible than in cases
where we are not.
Specific
application of this principle: Assuming
the fetus is a creature with full moral standing, whether or not a woman has a
moral obligation to continue her pregnancy depends (in part) on how responsible
she is for being pregnant in the first place; that is, on the extent to which
her pregnancy is the consequence of her own voluntary actions.
Generally speaking, our moral obligation to continue a pregnancy will be
stronger (other things being equal) when the pregnancy was the result of a fully
voluntary action, than where (as with the violinist example) the pregnancy is
totally involuntary.
But between these two extremes there is a range of cases where moral judgment is
more difficult.
1) Pregnancy caused by rape (totally involuntary).
2) Pregnancy caused by contraceptive failure, where the fault is entirely that
of the manufacturer. Or pregnancy caused by a botched vasectomy, where the fault
is entirely that of the surgeon.
3) Pregnancy caused by contraceptive failure within the advertised 1% margin of
error.
4) Pregnancy caused by the negligence of the woman (or the man or both).
They are careless in the use of the contraceptive or else fail to use it
at all, being unaware of a large risk that they ought to (could) have been aware
of.
5) Pregnancy caused by the recklessness of the woman (or the man or both).
They think of the risk but get swept along by passion and consciously
disregard it.
6) Pregnancy caused by the deliberate decision of the parties to produce it
(completely voluntary).
Adapted
from Joel Feinberg's essay, "Abortion," in Matters of Life and
Death, ed. Tom Regan.