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Deciding to Intervene: An Analysis of International and Domestic Influences on United States Interventions in Intrastate Disputes

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Although the United States has been the most prolific intervener in the international system since the end of World War II, there has been little consensus among scholars regarding the motivations of U.S. interventions in domestic political disputes abroad. In addition, scholars do not agree on the relative effects of international factors and domestic factors on intervention decisions by the U.S. Previous research on the motivations of U.S. interventions has occurred within at least two distinctive “streams” of literature: (1) studies of state interventions; and (2) studies of the use of military force by the U.S. Hypotheses regarding U.S. interventions in intrastate disputes are derived from the previous literature, and the hypotheses are tested using recently-compiled data on intrastate disputes and U.S. interventions in intrastate disputes occurring between 1945 and 2002. The results suggest a combination of international factors, including geographic proximity and ideological linkage, significantly influence the decisions of the U.S. to intervene in intrastate disputes. The results also suggest international factors are generally more important than domestic factors, and the effects of both domestic factors and international factors on U.S. intervention decisions may differ depending on the specific type of intervention and the time period.

KEYWORDS intervention, use of military force, power status, linkage, diversion, war weariness
Since the end of World War II, the United States government has been one of the most prolific intervening states in the international system (Yoon, 1997, p. 580). During much of the Cold War period, the U.S. frequently intervened in intrastate disputes involving competing groups with deep ideological differences. For example, the U.S. chose to intervene in support of the Greek government during a civil war against communist rebels in the late 1940s and 1950s. This particular intervention involved several hundred million dollars in U.S. military assistance and several hundred U.S. military advisors (Wittner, 1982). One of the largest and costliest U.S. intervention during the Cold War period involved more than 500,000 U.S. military personnel deployed in support of the South Vietnamese government in a civil war against communist rebels in the 1960s and 1970s (O’Ballance, 1975). The U.S. also intervened in support of anti-communist rebels in countries such as Angola and Nicaragua in the 1980s. Recent U.S. military interventions against the Taliban government in Afghanistan and the government of Saddam Hussein in Iraq involving some 200,000 military personnel demonstrates that while the specific motivations may have changed, the willingness and ability of the U.S. to get involved in civil conflicts — including large-scale military interventions in such conflicts — may not have changed much since the end of the Cold War.

Notwithstanding the prevalence of U.S. interventions since the end of World War II, there is little consensus among scholars regarding the motivations of U.S. intervention. Indeed, some scholars have argued international factors are more important motivations of US intervention, while other scholars have argued domestic factors are more important motivations. Perhaps one of the reasons for this lack of consensus is that previous research on factors influencing the occurrence of U.S. intervention abroad has occurred within two different “streams” of literature. The first stream focuses broadly on state intervention, while the second stream focuses more narrowly on analyses of the use of military force by the U.S. Many of the studies of state intervention in general, and U.S. intervention in particular, focus on international factors, while many of the studies of U.S. uses of military force focus on domestic factors. Not surprisingly, these analyses have often come to somewhat different conclusions.

In addition, both of these streams of literature are problematic for at least two reasons. First, most of these studies tend to focus on military intervention or use of military force, ignoring the fact that the full range of intervention options available to the U.S. includes both military and nonmilitary options. In addition, states may choose to intervene as an intermediary (nonpartisan intervention) or choose to intervene in support of or against one of the parties to a dispute (partisan intervention). Since there are different categories of third-party interventions, it is possible the motivations of U.S. interventions may vary across these different categories.
A second reason as to why previous studies are problematic relates to the fact that most of these studies tend to focus on a relatively short time period, ignoring the possibility that the motivations of U.S. interventions may vary across longer periods of time or across different time periods. In fact, most existing studies focus on some portion of the Cold War period. This limitation is, of course, related to the availability (or lack thereof) of data on U.S. interventions. Nevertheless, it is possible there are differences in the motivations of U.S. interventions across different time periods, including the Cold War period and the post-Cold War period.

To address the limitations of previous analyses of the motivations of U.S. interventions, this study focuses on the following three questions: (1) Which factors influence the decisions of the U.S. to intervene in intrastate disputes? (2) Are international factors or domestic factors more important influences on decisions by the U.S. to intervene? (3) Do the effects of international and domestic factors vary across different categories of intervention and across different time periods?

In addressing these questions, this study seeks to expand on existing scholarly literature by combining the empirical and theoretical insights of previous analyses of state intervention and use of military force. Perhaps more importantly, this study seeks to expand on existing literature by accounting for the full range of intervention options — including military, intermediary (nonpartisan), and participatory (partisan) — available to U.S. foreign policy decisionmakers. Unlike many of the previous analyses of state intervention and use of military force, this study focuses entirely on interventions in intrastate disputes as opposed to interventions in both intrastate and interstate disputes. The emphasis on intrastate disputes is necessary in order to account for the possibility that motivations may vary depending on the type of dispute. Finally, this study covers the 58-year period from 1945 to 2002, including the entire Cold War period and the post-Cold War period.

Following a brief review of the previous literature on both state intervention and use of military force, we present a set of theoretical arguments regarding the effect of international factors and domestic factors on the likelihood that the U.S. will decide to intervene in an intrastate dispute. A set of primary (international-level) hypotheses and alternative (domestic-level) hypotheses are derived from the theoretical arguments and are statistically tested against the historical record of intrastate disputes and U.S. interventions therein during the period from 1945 to 2002. The main purpose of the analysis is to evaluate these two sets of competing arguments regarding the likelihood of U.S. intervention. The results of the statistical analyses are then assessed in terms of their implications for subsequent analyses of U.S. interventions, as well as interventions by other state actors, in domestic political disputes.
LITERATURE REVIEW

The ever-growing empirical literature on state intervention and use of military force by the U.S. provides a number of important theoretical insights into the decisions by the U.S. to intervene in domestic political disputes abroad. Some of this literature has focused on international factors as possible influences on decisions by states to intervene in other states, including ideology, geographic proximity, previous adversarial interventions, and military alliances. Focusing on the influence of global "political ideologies" on state intervention, Oran Young (1968, p. 183) argued "the prevalence of intervention will tend to increase as these politically dynamic ideologies become more pervasive and influential" and the "existence of one or more actors with strong predispositions concerning appropriate forms of political order will raise pressures both for intervention and counter-intervention in international politics."

Several previous studies of state intervention and use of military force have also hypothesized that certain domestic factors — such as the electoral cycle, economic conditions, presidential support in Congress, and presidential popularity — are significant influences on decisions by states to intervene in other states. Indeed, many of these studies have suggested domestic factors are more influential than international factors when it comes to explaining the use of military force by the United States. For example, Charles Ostrom and Brian Job (1986, pp. 557–559) found that in the U.S. the "president is more prone to use force in times of economic stress" and concluded international factors were "not the single most important contextual determinant of decisions on the use of force." Likewise, Patrick James and John Oneal (1991, pp. 326–327) found domestic political considerations, including presidential popularity, presidential political success, and economic conditions, were "more strongly associated with the president's use of major levels of force" than international considerations.

Examining the effects of both international and domestic factors on the "severity" of U.S. responses in international crises between 1954 and 1986, Kevin Wang (1996, p. 92) found "domestic political factors such as the electoral cycle, economic difficulties, and presidential support in Congress affect crisis decision making." Specifically, the author indicated that "presidents select more intense responses when the economy is doing badly, when they are in the later stages of the electoral cycle, and when their general support in Congress, at least in terms of party membership, is high" (1996, p. 92).

Notwithstanding the empirical evidence suggesting domestic factors are significant influences on U.S. interventions, other scholars have concluded domestic factors are not significant influences on decisions by the U.S. to use military force. For example, James Meernik and Peter Waterman (1996, p. 587) concluded after statistically analyzing the effects of several domestic variables — including level of support for the president in the U.S.
Congress, presidential approval ratings, economic conditions and presidential elections — that “presidents are not motivated by domestic conditions when determining whether to use military force during an international crisis.” Furthermore, some scholars have argued that accounting for the factors that influence the “opportunities” for intervention or use of military may affect analyses of the relative importance of international factors and domestic factors. In his analysis of the effects of “strategic interaction” on foreign policy behavior, David Clark (2003, p. 1036) concluded that “accounting for the sources of opportunity tempers the extent to which domestic political concerns influence the propensity of U.S. presidents to use military force.”

THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS

Although scholars have emphasized both international and domestic factors in the previous literature on state intervention and use of military force, we argue in this study that decisions by the U.S. to intervene or not intervene in intrastate disputes since the end of World War II have primarily been influenced by a combination of international factors. As a major global power during this entire period, the U.S. has assumed global responsibilities that result in both global pressures to intervene and global constraints against intervening abroad. Indeed, several scholars have argued the global rivalry between the U.S. and Soviet Union after World War II influenced the occurrence of numerous interventions by both countries during the Cold War period. For example, Hans Morgenthau (1967, p. 428) noted during the Cold War that “aside from competing for influence upon a particular government in the traditional ways, the United States and the Soviet Union have interjected their power into the domestic conflicts of weak nations, supporting the government or the opposition as the case may be.” At the same time, Oran Young (1968, p. 181) argued the “existence of nuclear weapons is a major restraint on the intervention activities of the United States and the Soviet Union in the contemporary system.” These and other examples point to the importance of focusing on international level explanations of U.S. intervention decisions.

International Level Explanations

Assuming that decisions by the U.S. are primarily influenced by international factors, we have developed six primary explanations of U.S. intervention in intrastate disputes from the international level of analysis. First, U.S. intervention can be explained by the extent to which the U.S. is currently involved in a major overseas military engagement, including direct involvement in a major conflict with another state or a military intervention in an intrastate conflict in another state. The war involvement hypothesis
suggests the U.S. is less likely to intervene in an intrastate dispute if it is already militarily involved in a major interstate or intrastate conflict elsewhere (Fordham, 2004, p. 652; Ostrom and Job, 1986, p. 547). This hypothesis is based on the assumption the U.S. does not have an unlimited amount of capabilities and resources, and therefore, it would be too preoccupied diplomatically, economically, and militarily with its involvement in the major war to simultaneously deal with other international problems. In other words, it is assumed the U.S. is generally constrained from intervening in one location when its attention and resources are directed to its involvement in a major war in another location.

Second, U.S. intervention can be explained by the geographic proximity of the target state (i.e., the state experiencing the domestic political dispute) to the U.S. The geographic proximity hypothesis suggests the United States is more likely to choose to intervene in an intrastate dispute if the target state is geographically proximate to the U.S. (Byman et al., 2001, p. 23; Feste, 1992, pp. 17–18; Heraclides, 1990, p. 343; Luard, 1988, p. 121; Pearson, 1974, p. 433; Yoon, 1997, p. 582). This hypothesis assumes domestic political disputes occurring in neighboring states have a greater potential to adversely affect the national interests of the U.S. than such disputes occurring in more distant states. For example, political instability in a neighboring state might result in the flow of refugees and asylum seekers to the U.S. (e.g., Haitian refugees in the early 1990s), potentially resulting in economic, political, and social repercussions in the U.S. Furthermore, it is assumed the U.S. would be pressured to intervene in a neighboring state experiencing domestic political instability in order to minimize the repercussions at home.

The third international-level explanation of U.S. intervention pertains to the relative power status of the target state. Specifically, the power status hypothesis suggests the U.S. is less likely to choose to intervene in a relatively powerful state experiencing domestic political instability. This hypothesis is based on the assumption the U.S. would be reluctant to intervene in a target state in which the relative impact of an intervention would be minimal and in which the level of U.S. diplomatic, economic, or military involvement required for making an impact would necessarily be large. In other words, it is assumed the expected costs and risks associated with intervening in domestic political disputes in powerful states would outweigh the expected benefits, thereby placing an important constraint on the decision of the U.S. to intervene under these circumstances.

The fourth international-level explanation of U.S. intervention concerns nonstrategic (or affective) linkages between the target state and the U.S. Specifically, the linkages hypothesis suggests the United States is more likely to choose to intervene in an intrastate dispute when there is an ideological, ethnic, or humanitarian linkage between one or more groups in the target state and one or more groups in the U.S. (Byman et al., 2001, p. 37;
Cooper and Berdal, 1993, p. 134; Heraclides, 1990, p. 373; Mitchell, 1970, p. 182–187). This hypothesis assumes the U.S. would be compelled to intervene in an intrastate dispute as a result of pressure placed on it by a particular societal group or government bureaucracy that has an ideological, ethnic, or humanitarian affinity to or concern with one or more parties in an intrastate dispute.

Examining the sources of humanitarian intervention, Jon Western (2002, pp. 117–118) argued “liberal humanitarianists who filled the ranks of humanitarian and human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)” pressured the G. H. W. Bush administration to militarily intervene in Somalia in December 1992. Likewise, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat (2000, p. 12) suggested “[p]ublic opinion in western-style democracies will often be moved by the images of humanitarian atrocities, leading citizens to pressure their governments to intervene.” For a variety of reasons, the U.S. may similarly be influenced by ethnic groups in the U.S. that have linkages to their respective countries of origin or ancestral homelands. Indeed, Yossi Shain (1994–1995, p. 813) suggested “the fact that Congress, and therefore constituency politics, has an important voice in U.S. foreign policy . . . provides a fertile base for an organized and strongly committed [ethnic] diaspora that may transform itself into a powerful political player with transnational implications.”

The fifth international-level explanation of U.S. intervention pertains to the prior involvement of adversaries of the U.S. in the target state. Specifically, the adversary intervention hypothesis suggests the U.S. is more likely to choose to intervene in an intrastate dispute when an adversary of the U.S. has previously intervened in the dispute (Luard, 1972, pp. 15–16; Heraclides, 1990, p. 343; Yoon, 1997, p. 592; Vertzberger, 1998, p. 167). This hypothesis is based on the assumption the national interests of the U.S. compel it to intervene in a target state in order to counter the influence of an adversarial state that has already intervened in that state. A counterintervention by the U.S. would be necessary because the success of an adversarial state in achieving its goals during an intervention might result in an increase in the prestige and influence of the adversarial state in the region of the target state, and consequently, could result in a decrease in the prestige and influence of the U.S.

Finally, U.S. intervention in intrastate disputes can be explained by the level of democracy in the target state. The nondemocracy hypothesis suggests the U.S. is more likely to choose to intervene in an intrastate dispute if the government of the target state is not democratic (Hermann and Kegley, 1996, p. 439). This hypothesis assumes, at least since the end of World War II, one of the major foreign policy goals of the U.S. has been to promote democracy throughout the world (Meernik, 1996, pp. 392–394; Peceny, 1995, p. 371). One of the methods of promoting democracy is to intervene in a nondemocratic state with the goal of directly influencing the government.
of the target state to make a transition from nondemocracy to democracy. According to Mark Peceny (1995, p. 577), U.S. military interventions “can have a positive impact on democracy in target states, but only if the US promotes free and fair elections during its intervention.”

Domestic Level Explanations
In addition to the preceding international-level hypotheses, we have also identified an alternative set of explanations of U.S. intervention in intrastate disputes from the domestic level of analysis. First, U.S. interventions can be explained by the tendency of U.S. government leaders to seek to divert public attention away from bad economic conditions at home through diplomatic, economic, or military intervention overseas. Specifically, the diversionary intervention hypothesis suggests the U.S. is more likely to choose to intervene in a domestic political dispute in a target state if there are economic problems occurring in the U.S. (Morgan and Bickers, 1992, p. 49; Ostrom and Job, 1986, p. 548; Yoon, 1997, p. 584). This hypothesis assumes U.S. government leaders are motivated, primarily for domestic political reasons, to intervene in an intrastate dispute abroad in order to divert public attention from the poor state of the U.S. economy.

Second, U.S. intervention in intrastate disputes can be explained by the recent involvement of the U.S. in a major war. Specifically, the war weariness hypothesis suggests the U.S. government is less likely to choose to intervene in a target state if the U.S. has recently ended its involvement in a major war. This hypothesis is based on the assumption the willingness of the American public to support an overseas intervention is significantly diminished by the “common experience of a severe and destructive war” (Cashman, 2000, p. 153). In other words, there may be an “aversion” among the American public to risk foreign involvement of any sort, particular military involvement, in the aftermath of a conflict involving thousands of U.S. military fatalities and injuries (Ostrom and Job, 1986, p. 548). Furthermore, it is assumed the American public’s reluctance to support foreign involvement has a direct, or at least indirect, effect on the decisions of U.S. government leaders. According to Karl DeRouen (1995, p. 675), “it is generally agreed that public opinion can constrain decisions to use force because of the relevance of foreign policy decisions to elections.”

The third and fourth domestic-level explanations of U.S. intervention in intrastate disputes pertain to the influence of U.S. presidential and midterm elections on the likelihood of U.S. intervention. Specifically, the presidential election hypothesis suggests the U.S. is generally less likely to choose to intervene in a target state in the months prior to a U.S. presidential election (Yoon, 1997, pp. 583–584). This hypothesis assumes incumbent U.S. presidents are reluctant to take the risk of initiating a potentially costly and controversial intervention abroad while campaigning for reelection at home.
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(or while a member of the same political party is campaigning to replace the incumbent in a presidential election). On the other hand, the midterm election hypothesis suggests the United States is more likely to choose to intervene in a target state in the months prior to a midterm election (Ostrom and Job, 1986, p. 549). This hypothesis is based on the assumption an incumbent president is politically motivated to initiate an intervention prior to a midterm election as a means of enhancing the popularity of his or her political party among the American public. Since the incumbent president’s political party historically loses seats in the U.S. Congress in midterm elections, the president might seek to limit the size of the losses, or even gain seats, through a high profile and successful foreign policy initiative.

Finally, U.S. intervention in domestic political disputes can be explained by the partisan control of the executive and legislative branches of the government. Specifically, the unified government hypothesis suggests the U.S. is more likely to choose to intervene in a target state when the same political party controls both the White House and both chambers of the Congress. In other words, there is more likely to be an intervention when there is a “unified government” as opposed to a “divided government,” which occurs when the president’s political party does not control one or both chambers of the Congress (Gowa, 1998, p. 314). To put it differently, there is less likely to be an intervention when the president’s political party does not control both chambers of the U.S. Congress, since the Congress serves as a constraint on the decisions of the president to intervene overseas. In fact, Alastair Smith (1996, p. 148) argued “Congress is more likely to place strict controls on the presidential use of force when there is a divided government.” This hypothesis assumes the foreign policy powers of the U.S. Congress generally serve as “check and balance” on the foreign policy powers of the president. However, this institutional constraint is diminished significantly when the president’s political party has a majority of the seats in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.

RESEARCH DESIGN

In order to evaluate the competing international-level and domestic-level explanations of the likelihood of U.S. intervention in intrastate disputes, we use data from the Third-Party Interventions in Intrastate Disputes (TPI-Intrastate Disputes) Project.9 The project has identified a total of 256 cases of intrastate disputes occurring during the twentieth century. In order to distinguish between the different stages of the disputes, the 256 intrastate disputes have been disaggregated into a total of 1,475 dispute phases, which includes precrisis, crisis, conflict, postconflict, and postcrisis phases.10 Of these 1,475 dispute phases, there are a total of 756 crisis, conflict, and post-conflict phases that began on or after January 1, 1945. In addition to the
intrastate disputes, the TPI-Intrastate Disputes project has also identified thousands of third-party interventions in the intrastate disputes, including 410 cases of intervention by the U.S. during the period from 1945 to 2002.\textsuperscript{11} The 410 U.S. interventions include 78 cases of intermediary (nonpartisan) intervention and 332 cases of participatory (partisan) intervention. Both of these categories of intervention include cases of military intervention and non-military intervention.

In any analysis of decisions by the U.S. government to intervene or not intervene in intrastate disputes, it is important to choose units of analysis that represent “opportunity” for the U.S. to intervene (Starr, 1978; Most and Starr, 1989). In other words, the analysis must include cases or situations in which the U.S. chose to intervene, as well as cases or situations in which the U.S. had the opportunity to intervene but chose not to do so. According to H. W. Brands (1987/1988, p. 621), domestic political violence and instability provide an “opportunity for intervention” on the part of the U.S. Similarly, Meernik and Waterman (1996, p. 576) suggested the “most appropriate unit of analysis from which to predict foreign policy behavior is the international crisis, or opportunity to use force.” Therefore, we suggest that the 756 crisis, conflict, and post-conflict phases of intrastate disputes represent distinct opportunities for the United States to decide to intervene in order to pursue its strategic and nonstrategic goals throughout the world.

Dependent Variables

Since there are multiple categories of third-party intervention, four different dependent variables are used in four different models in this study: (1) Intervention - the occurrence of any type of U.S. intervention; (2) Intermediary - the occurrence of U.S. intermediary or nonpartisan interventions; (3) Participatory – the occurrence of U.S. participatory or partisan interventions; and (4) Military – the occurrence of U.S. military (intermediary or participatory) interventions. Intermediary intervention is defined as any external involvement — military or nonmilitary — in a dispute that is not overtly in support of or opposition to one of the parties to the dispute (e.g., mediation and peacekeeping). Participatory intervention is defined as any external involvement — military or nonmilitary — in a dispute that is overtly supportive of or opposed to one of the parties to the dispute (e.g., military assistance and economic sanctions). Lastly, military intervention is defined as any external involvement in a dispute consisting of the mobilization of military force or use of military force of 500 or more military personnel.

We have chosen to dichotomize the various dependent variables in this study (as opposed to creating one dependent variable with four or more categories) since the major categories of intervention are not mutually exclusive. In fact, we suggest there are basically two dimensions of intervention, including a partisan/nonpartisan dimension and a military/nonmilitary
For each of the four models, the dependent variable is coded “1” when the United States decided to intervene during a dispute phase and is coded “0” otherwise.

Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of U.S. intermediary and participatory interventions during the period from 1945 to 2002. As shown in the graph, the number of U.S. interventions during five-year intervals has ranged from a low of 17 interventions in 1970–1974 to a high of 53 in 1960–1964. According to the graph, there are at least three phases of U.S. intervention in intrastate disputes. During the early-Cold War phase from 1945 to 1964, the number of U.S. interventions was generally in the 30 to 55 range. The number of interventions declined to the 15 to 30 range during much of the late-Cold War phase from 1965 to 1989, except for the period from 1975 to 1979. After decreasing during the 1980s, the number of U.S. interventions increased to the 35 to 45 range during the post-Cold War phase from 1990 to 2002. Except for the immediate post-World War II period and the post-Cold War period, U.S. participatory interventions have far surpassed the number of U.S. intermediary interventions in any given five-year period.

Independent Variables

For each of the international-level and domestic-level hypotheses discussed in the previous section, we have identified and operationalized one or more independent variables. Each of these variables is briefly discussed below.

War Involvement — coded “1” if the United States was involved in a “major war” at the start of the dispute phase (or at the start of a U.S.
intervention, if there was such an intervention, during the dispute phase); coded “0” otherwise. The term “major conflict” is defined as an interstate or intrastate conflict involving 100,000 or more U.S. military personnel at any one time during the conflict. Given this definition, major conflicts occurring between 1945 and 2002 include the Korean War (June 1950–June 1953), Vietnam War (March 1965–June 1973), and Persian Gulf War (September 1990–March 1991).

**Geographic Proximity** — coded “1” if the target state shares a territorial border with the U.S. or is located within 500 miles of the territory of the U.S. in the Caribbean region; coded “0” otherwise. Based on this coding protocol, the following countries are geographically proximate to the U.S. (including Panama Canal Zone between February 26, 1904 and October 1, 1979): Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Panama.

**Power Status** — coded “1” if the target state is a major global power; coded “0” otherwise. The major global powers are the Soviet Union/Russia, People’s Republic of China, France, and United Kingdom.

**Ideological Linkage** — coded “1” if there is a salient “ideological linkage” between the target state and the U.S.; coded “0” otherwise. There is a salient “ideological linkage” if the government or an opposition group in the target state is identified with communism or anti-communism during the Cold War period.

**Ethnic Linkage** — coded “1” if there is a salient “ethnic linkage” between the target state and the U.S.; coded “0” otherwise. For the purposes of this study, there is a salient “ethnic linkage” if the target state is one of the following countries: Israel (Jewish-Americans); Cuba (Cuban-Americans); Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh/Azerbaijan (Armenian-Americans); Ireland and Northern Ireland/United Kingdom (Irish-Americans); Italy (Italian-Americans); Greece and Cyprus (Greek-Americans); Poland (Polish-Americans); Mexico (Mexican-Americans); and South Africa, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Liberia, and Haiti (African-Americans).12

**Humanitarian Linkage** — coded “1” if there is a salient “humanitarian linkage” between the target state and the U.S.; coded “0” otherwise. There is a salient “humanitarian linkage” if there was an average of 1,000 or more annual civilian/military fatalities during the current dispute phase (or the previous dispute phase) or 75,000 or more displaced civilians in the target state during the current dispute phase (or the previous dispute phase).13

**Adversary Intervention** — coded “1” if there was a previous intervention by an “adversary” of the U.S. in the target state during the dispute phase or during the five-year period prior to the start of the dispute phase; coded “0” otherwise. A country is considered an “adversary” of the U.S. if the two countries experienced three or more “militarized interstate disputes” during any ten-year period between 1945 and 2002 or experienced one
“militarized interstate dispute” lasting for twelve or more consecutive months during this same period.\textsuperscript{14}

\textit{Nondemocracy} — coded “1” if the target state is not a “democracy” at the start of the dispute phase (or at the start of a U.S. intervention if there was such an intervention during the dispute phase); coded “0” otherwise. For the purposes of this study, a state is considered a “democracy” if it has a score of 7 through 10 on a scale of −10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic) using \textit{Polity IV} data.\textsuperscript{15}

\textit{Diversionary Intervention} — coded “1” if there was negative economic growth (or a net reduction in “real” or inflation-adjusted GDP) during the 12-month period prior to the start of the dispute phase (or prior to the start of a U.S. intervention if there was such an intervention during the dispute phase); coded “0” otherwise.\textsuperscript{16}

\textit{War Weariness} — coded “1” if the dispute phase (or U.S. intervention if there was such an intervention during the dispute phase) began within five years of the end of a major war (i.e., Korean War, Vietnam War, and Persian Gulf War); coded “0” otherwise.\textsuperscript{17}

\textit{Presidential Election} — coded “1” if the dispute phase (or U.S. intervention if there was such an intervention during the dispute phase) began during the 12-month period prior to a presidential election in the U.S.; coded “0” otherwise.

\textit{Midterm Election} — coded “1” if the dispute phase (or U.S. intervention if there was such an intervention during the dispute phase) began during the 12-month period prior to a midterm election in the U.S.; coded “0” otherwise.

\textit{Unified Government} — coded “1” if both chambers of the U.S. Congress were controlled by the president’s political party at the start of the dispute phase (or at the start of a U.S. intervention if there was such an intervention during the dispute phase); coded “0” otherwise.\textsuperscript{18}

\section*{Control Variables}

Five additional sets of variables are included in each of the models to control for the various attributes of intrastate disputes or other contextual factors that might influence the likelihood of U.S. intervention in an intrastate dispute. First, the likelihood of U.S. intervention may be influenced by the particular phase type of an intrastate dispute. For example, the United States may be more or less likely to choose to intervene when the parties to a dispute are already involved in military hostilities (i.e., conflict phase). Therefore, we include dummy variables for two of the three possible types of dispute phases (\textit{Crisis and Conflict}). Second, the likelihood of U.S. intervention in an intrastate dispute may be influenced by whether or not the U.S. intervened in the previous phase of the dispute (\textit{Previous Intervention}).
The third set of control variables accounts for the possibility the likelihood of U.S. intervention may be affected by whether or not there is an ethnic or religious dimension to the intrastate dispute (*Ethnicity and Religion*). For example, the United States may perceive ethnic and religious disputes to be intractable compared to ideological disputes, and therefore, might refrain from intervening in disputes with ethnic and/or religious dimensions. Fourth, the likelihood of U.S. intervention may be influenced by the particular period of the dispute phase, and so we include a dummy variable to account for the possibility the U.S. was more or less likely to intervene during the Cold War period than the post-Cold War period (*Cold War*). Finally, the likelihood of U.S. intervention may be affected by the particular region of the target state (Asia/Pacific, Europe, Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa). The omitted category for the set of regional control variables is the Western Hemisphere.

**EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS**

Before discussing the results of the initial analyses of the international-level and domestic-level hypotheses regarding the likelihood of U.S. intervention in an intrastate dispute, we provide descriptive statistics for each of the independent and dependent variables in Table 1. As shown in column 1 of the table, the U.S. intervened in 46 out of 150 intrastate disputes phases (30.7%) occurring when the U.S. was currently involved in a major war. In addition, the U.S. intervened in 21 out of 48 of cases (43.8%) in which the target state was geographically proximate to the territory of the U.S. Similar information is provided for each of the four models corresponding to the different categories of interventions. For example, column 4 of the table indicates the U.S. militarily intervened in only 7 out of 150 cases (4.7%) when it was involved in a major war, but militarily intervened in 6 out of 48 cases (12.5%) in which the target state was geographically proximate to the territory of the US.

In addition to descriptive statistics regarding each of the independent variables, there are also descriptive statistics for each of the dependent variables. Specifically, the column totals indicate the U.S. chose to intervene in one manner or another in 221 out of 756 intrastate dispute phases (29.2%). Furthermore, the U.S. chose to intervene as an intermediary in 58 out of 756 cases (7.7%), and chose to intervene as a participant in 189 out of 756 cases (25.0%). Lastly, the U.S. chose to intervene militarily (intermediary or participatory) in 34 out of 756 cases (4.5%).

Since the dependent variable in each of the four models is measured dichotomously, we use logistic regression to estimate the separate effects of each of the independent variables on the dependent variables. Table 2 contains the logistic regression coefficients for each of the four models. The
coefficients for the independent variables Ideological Linkage, Ethnic Linkage, Humanitarian Linkage, Adversary Intervention, Nondemocracy, and Unified Government are in the predicted directions and statistically significant in Model 1 (where the dependent variable is the occurrence of any type of U.S. intervention). In the same model, the coefficients for War Involvement, Geographic Proximity, Power Status, War Weariness, Presidential Election, and Midterm Election are in the predicted directions but not statistically significant. Only the coefficient for Diversionary Intervention is neither in the predicted direction nor statistically significant in Model 1.

Given the difficulty of interpreting logistic coefficients, predicted probabilities for each of the independent variables are provided in Table 3. Specifically, the table provides estimates of the probabilities of the four categories of U.S. intervention given the influence of each of the international and domestic factors. The baseline probability represents the probability of
a U.S. intervention in an intrastate dispute when all of the independent variables and control variables are set at “0,” except for conflict, previous intervention, ethnicity, Cold War, and Asia which are set at “1.” For example, column 1 of Table 3 indicates the probability of a U.S. intervention in an intrastate dispute is not substantially different from the baseline probability of 17 percent given that the U.S. is currently involved in a major war.
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The same is true for geographic proximity and power status. On the other hand, the probability of a U.S. intervention is more than twice as high as the baseline probability of 17 percent given that there is an ideological linkage or an ethnic linkage between groups in the United States and a target state (35 percent and 36 percent, respectively).

The logistic regression results and predicted probabilities for the four models in Tables 2 and 3 indicate there are varying levels of support for each of the primary hypotheses derived from the international level of analysis. For example, there is only minimal evidence in support of the war involvement hypothesis, which suggested the U.S. would be less likely to intervene in an intrastate dispute when it is currently involved in a major war elsewhere. The logistic regression coefficients corresponding to the war involvement hypothesis in Table 2 are statistically significant in none of the four models, although the coefficients are in the predicted direction in three of the four models (Models 1, 2, and 3). As shown in Table 3, the probability of a U.S. intervention is only slightly less than the baseline probability of 17 percent when the U.S. is currently involved in a major war (15 percent). Overall, the results suggest the U.S. may be somewhat less likely to intervene in an intrastate dispute when it is currently

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>(1) Intervention</th>
<th>(2) Intermediary Intervention</th>
<th>(3) Participatory Intervention</th>
<th>(4) Military Intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Probability</td>
<td>.17 (.06)</td>
<td>.04 (.03)</td>
<td>.13 (.06)</td>
<td>.04 (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Involvement</td>
<td>.15 (.06)</td>
<td>.04 (.04)</td>
<td>.11 (.06)</td>
<td>.05 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Proximity</td>
<td>.19 (.08)</td>
<td>.17 (.12)</td>
<td>.13 (.06)</td>
<td>.10 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Status</td>
<td>.14 (.06)</td>
<td>.03 (.03)</td>
<td>.15 (.08)</td>
<td>.04 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Linkage</td>
<td>.35 (.10)</td>
<td>.17 (.11)</td>
<td>.25 (.09)</td>
<td>.12 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Linkage</td>
<td>.36 (.12)</td>
<td>.19 (.14)</td>
<td>.22 (.10)</td>
<td>.06 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Linkage</td>
<td>.29 (.09)</td>
<td>.08 (.05)</td>
<td>.24 (.08)</td>
<td>.08 (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary Intervention</td>
<td>.27 (.10)</td>
<td>.05 (.04)</td>
<td>.24 (.10)</td>
<td>.07 (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nondemocracy</td>
<td>.33 (.09)</td>
<td>.03 (.02)</td>
<td>.33 (.09)</td>
<td>.09 (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversionary Intervention</td>
<td>.15 (.06)</td>
<td>.06 (.04)</td>
<td>.11 (.05)</td>
<td>.03 (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Weariness</td>
<td>.16 (.07)</td>
<td>.05 (.04)</td>
<td>.11 (.05)</td>
<td>.05 (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Election</td>
<td>.14 (.05)</td>
<td>.03 (.03)</td>
<td>.11 (.05)</td>
<td>.03 (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midterm Election</td>
<td>.17 (.07)</td>
<td>.06 (.04)</td>
<td>.13 (.06)</td>
<td>.06 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified Government</td>
<td>.22 (.08)</td>
<td>.06 (.05)</td>
<td>.18 (.08)</td>
<td>.06 (.07)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Cell entries are probabilities of the occurrence of a U.S. intervention when each of the independent variables is separately set at 1, with all other independent variables set at 0. Standard errors are in parentheses. The baseline probability is the probability of the occurrence of a U.S. intervention using all 756 cases of intrastate crisis and conflict when all of the independent variables are set at 0 (the baseline probability assumes that the dispute phase is a conflict phase, the United States intervened during the previous dispute phase, the dispute phase has an ethnic dimension, the dispute phase began during the Cold War, and the dispute took place in Asia). Probabilities are estimated using Clarify 2.1 with Stata 8.0.
involved in a major war elsewhere, but the evidence in support of the hypothesis is minimal.

On the other hand, there is stronger evidence in support of the *geographic proximity hypothesis*, which suggested the U.S. would be more likely to intervene in a target state that was geographically proximate to it. The coefficients corresponding to the geographic proximity hypothesis in Table 2 are in the predicted direction and statistically significant in two of the four models (Models 2 and 4). Specifically, the results indicate U.S. intermediary and military interventions are significantly more likely to occur when the target state is geographically proximate to the U.S. As shown in Table 3, the probability of a U.S. intermediary intervention is more than four times greater than the baseline probability of four percent when the target state is geographically proximate to the U.S. (17 percent). In addition, the probability of a U.S. military intervention is more than twice greater than the baseline probability of four percent when the target state is geographically proximate to the U.S. (10 percent).

Interestingly, the results in Model 3 indicate U.S. participatory interventions are not significantly more (or less) likely to occur when the target state is geographically proximate to the U.S. How do we account for the significance of geographic proximity in the case of non-partisan interventions, but the lack of significance in the case of partisan interventions? One plausible explanation for why the U.S. might be more likely to intervene as an intermediary when the target state is geographically proximate is the possibility the U.S. has concluded that it is in its national interest to assist in managing or resolving domestic political disputes in neighboring states. In other words, it might not be in the national interest of the U.S. to encourage domestic instability in neighboring states (through partisan intervention) and risk the spread of such instability to other states in the region.

Similar to the war involvement hypothesis, there is only minimal evidence in support of the *power status hypothesis*. The coefficients corresponding to the hypothesis in Table 2 are statistically significant in none of the models, but the coefficients are in the predicted direction in three of the four models (Models 1, 3, and 4). According to Table 3, the probability of a U.S. intermediary intervention is only slightly less than the baseline probability of four percent when the target state is a major power (3 percent), while the probability of a U.S. participatory intervention is only slightly more than the baseline probability of 13 percent when the target state is a major power (15 percent). Overall, the results suggest U.S. intermediary interventions may be somewhat less likely and U.S. participatory interventions may be somewhat more likely when the target state is a major global power, but here again the evidence in support of the hypothesis is minimal.

There is strong evidence in support of the *linkages hypothesis*. In general, the results indicate the U.S. is significantly more likely to intervene in intrastate disputes when there are ideological, ethnic, or humanitarian
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linkages between groups in the U.S. and groups in the target state. Specifically, the coefficients for the ideological linkage and humanitarian linkage variables in Table 2 are in the predicted direction and statistically significant in each of the four models. Furthermore, the coefficients for the ethnic linkage variable are in the predicted direction and statistically significant in three of the four models (Models 1, 2, and 4). As shown in Table 3, the probability of a U.S. intervention is approximately twice the baseline probability of 17 percent when there is an ideological, ethnic, or humanitarian linkage between groups in the U.S. and target state (35 percent, 36 percent, and 29 percent, respectively).

In addition, there is some evidence in support of the adversary intervention hypothesis, which suggested the United States would be more likely to intervene in an intrastate dispute if an adversary had previously intervened in the dispute. Specifically, the coefficients corresponding to the hypothesis are in the predicted direction and statistically significant in two of the four models (Models 1 and 3), and the coefficients are in the predicted direction but not statistically significant in the other two models (Models 2 and 4). As shown in Table 3, the probability of a U.S. intervention is substantially greater than the baseline probability of 17 percent when an adversary of the U.S. previously intervened in the target state (27 percent). Also, the probability of a U.S. participatory intervention is nearly twice the baseline probability of 13 percent when an adversary of the U.S. previously intervened in the target state (24 percent). Overall, the results suggest U.S. interventions in general — and participatory interventions in particular — are significantly more likely to occur when an adversary of the U.S. has previously intervened in the target state.

Finally, there is considerable evidence in support of the nondemocracy hypothesis. The coefficients corresponding to the hypothesis in Table 2 are in the predicted direction in all four models and are statistically significant in three of the four models (Models 1, 3, and 4). The results indicate U.S. participatory and military interventions are significantly more likely when the government of the target state is not democratic. According to Table 3, the probability of a U.S. participatory intervention is more than twice the baseline probability of 13 percent when the target state is nondemocratic (33 percent). In addition, the probability of a U.S. military intervention is more than twice the baseline probability of four percent when the target state is nondemocratic (nine percent). Indeed, the results provide compelling evidence in support of arguments made by scholars who suggest the U.S. is motivated to intervene overseas in order to promote democracy.

Contrary to the results discussed above regarding the primary (international-level) hypotheses, there is only minimal support across the four models for the alternative (domestic-level) hypotheses. For example, there is little support for the diversionary intervention hypothesis, which suggested the U.S. would be more likely to intervene overseas when there
are economic problems at home in order to divert the public’s attention away from the economy. Indeed, none of the coefficients corresponding to the hypothesis in Table 2 are statistically significant, and only one of the coefficients is in the predicted direction (Model 2). As shown in Table 3, the probability of a U.S. intermediary intervention in a target state is only slightly higher than the baseline probability of four percent when there are economic problems in the U.S. (six percent). On the other hand, the probabilities of U.S. participatory and military interventions in target states are slightly lower than the baseline probabilities of 13 and 4 percent when there are economic problems in the U.S. (11 and 3 percent, respectively).

Likewise, there is little support for the war weariness hypothesis, which suggested the United States would be less likely to intervene in a target state if the U.S. had recently ended its involvement in a major war. Only two of the coefficients corresponding to the hypothesis in Table 2 are in the predicted direction (Models 1 and 3), and none of the coefficients are statistically significant in the four models. According to Table 3, the probability of a U.S. intervention in a target state is only slightly less than the baseline probability of 17 percent if the U.S. had recently ended its involvement in a major war (16 percent).

As with the previous domestic level hypotheses, there is minimal support for the presidential election hypothesis and midterm election hypothesis. While each of the four coefficients corresponding to the presidential election hypothesis in Table 2 is in the predicted direction, none of the coefficients are statistically significant. Likewise, none of the coefficients corresponding to the midterm election hypothesis are statistically significant, although three of the four coefficients are in the predicted direction. As shown in Table 3, the probabilities of U.S. interventions in target states are not substantially different from the baseline probabilities when there are upcoming presidential or midterm elections in the U.S. Overall, while it is possible the U.S. is less likely to intervene in intrastate disputes during presidential election years and more likely to intervene during midterm elections years, the evidence in support of these hypotheses is minimal.

Finally, there is some evidence in support of the unified government hypothesis, which suggested the U.S. would be more likely to intervene in an intrastate dispute when the president’s political party controls a majority of the seats in both chambers of the U.S. Congress. Specifically, the coefficients corresponding to the hypothesis in Table 2 are in the predicted direction in each of the four models, and the coefficients are statistically significant in two of the four models (Models 1 and 3). As shown in Table 3, the probability of a U.S. participatory intervention is somewhat greater than the baseline probability of 13 percent when the president’s political party controls a majority of the seats in both chambers of the US Congress (18 percent). The results suggest the U.S. is somewhat more likely to choose to intervene — particularly in a partisan manner — when there is a “unified government” in the U.S.
Are there any significant differences in the effects of international and domestic factors on the likelihood of U.S. intervention in intrastate disputes between the Cold War period and the post-Cold War period? The logistic regression results shown in Tables 4 (Cold War period) and Table 5 (post-Cold War period) indicate while there are many similarities in the results between the two periods, there are some notable differences as well. For example, the U.S. was generally less likely to intervene in a domestic political dispute occurring in a major power state during the Cold War period (three out of four of the coefficients for power status are negative in Table 4), but was generally more likely to intervene in such states during the post-Cold War period (three out of three coefficients are positive in Table 5). This result may reflect the fact the U.S. was the only remaining “superpower” after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. In other words, the power of the U.S. was significantly greater than the power of any other state, including major global powers such as Russia and China, during the post-Cold War period.

In addition, the United States was generally more likely to intervene in a target state when one of its adversaries had previously intervened during the Cold War (four out of four of the coefficients for adversary intervention are positive in Table 4), but was generally less likely to intervene in such cases during the post-Cold War period (three out of three coefficients are negative in Table 5). Again, this result probably reflects the end of the superpower rivalry, which generated interventions and counter-interventions during the Cold War period, in the early 1990s. Lastly, the results from Tables 4 and 5 indicate that when the Cold War period and post-Cold War period are examined separately, international level factors are still relatively more important influences on the likelihood of U.S. intervention than domestic level factors, although these particular international factors appear to have a greater effect during the Cold War period.

CONCLUSION

At the beginning of this paper, we posed three questions regarding the occurrence of U.S. intervention in intrastate disputes. First, which factors influence the decisions of the United States to intervene in intrastate disputes? Second, are international factors or domestic factors more important influences on decisions by the U.S. to intervene? Lastly, do the effects of international and domestic factors vary across different categories of intervention and across different time periods? Using data on intrastate disputes and U.S. interventions occurring between 1945 and 2002, we found compelling evidence a combination of international factors such as geographic proximity and ideological linkage influences the decisions of the U.S. to intervene in intrastate disputes abroad. In addition, we surprisingly found
### TABLE 4 Logit Analyses of the Occurrence of United States Interventions in Intrastate Disputes (Cold War)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1 (Intervention)</th>
<th>Model 2 (Intermediary)</th>
<th>Model 3 (Participatory)</th>
<th>Model 4 (Military)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War Involvement</td>
<td>-.202 (.292)</td>
<td>-.095 (.543)</td>
<td>-.211 (.304)</td>
<td>-.129 (.525)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Proximity</td>
<td>.085 (.351)</td>
<td>2.179*** (.666)</td>
<td>-.028 (.347)</td>
<td>1.016* (.787)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Status</td>
<td>-.696** (.392)</td>
<td>-.737 (1.030)</td>
<td>-.380 (.426)</td>
<td>.045 (.803)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Linkage</td>
<td>.708*** (.261)</td>
<td>.954** (.559)</td>
<td>.632*** (.263)</td>
<td>1.034** (.475)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Linkage</td>
<td>1.555*** (.433)</td>
<td>1.818** (.805)</td>
<td>.990** (.481)</td>
<td>-.102 (1.196)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Linkage</td>
<td>1.021*** (.316)</td>
<td>.242 (.583)</td>
<td>1.163*** (.325)</td>
<td>.160 (.729)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary Intervention</td>
<td>.846*** (.329)</td>
<td>.941** (.449)</td>
<td>.894*** (.330)</td>
<td>.984* (.625)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Democracy Intervention</td>
<td>1.198*** (.312)</td>
<td>-.470 (.607)</td>
<td>1.356*** (.338)</td>
<td>.689 (.848)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversionary Intervention</td>
<td>-.352 (.305)</td>
<td>.845* (.544)</td>
<td>-.512* (.316)</td>
<td>-.476 (.706)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Weariness</td>
<td>.195 (.310)</td>
<td>.517 (.497)</td>
<td>.167 (.309)</td>
<td>-.529 (.683)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Election</td>
<td>-.097 (.277)</td>
<td>.027 (.710)</td>
<td>-.151 (.264)</td>
<td>-.364 (.720)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midterm Election</td>
<td>.337 (.301)</td>
<td>.708 (.601)</td>
<td>.105 (.297)</td>
<td>.601 (.565)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified Government</td>
<td>.405* (.274)</td>
<td>.102 (.470)</td>
<td>.529** (.263)</td>
<td>.175 (.562)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis</td>
<td>1.814*** (.435)</td>
<td>-.748 (.983)</td>
<td>2.017*** (.480)</td>
<td>1.988* (.835)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>1.473*** (.380)</td>
<td>1.404** (.580)</td>
<td>1.204*** (.370)</td>
<td>1.645** (.555)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Conflict</td>
<td>1.550*** (.369)</td>
<td>.569 (.561)</td>
<td>1.359*** (.380)</td>
<td>2.205*** (.604)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity Intervention</td>
<td>-.755*** (.267)</td>
<td>-.052 (.589)</td>
<td>-.836*** (.288)</td>
<td>-.822 (.738)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>.310 (.302)</td>
<td>.929*** (.472)</td>
<td>-.001 (.313)</td>
<td>.028 (.799)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia/Pacific</td>
<td>-.263 (.541)</td>
<td>-.804 (.807)</td>
<td>.050 (.566)</td>
<td>2.310*** (.793)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>-.529 (.471)</td>
<td>-.518 (1.259)</td>
<td>-.227 (.489)</td>
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<td>.545 (.957)</td>
<td>-.760* (.401)</td>
<td>1.545 (1.089)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>-1.336*** (.422)</td>
<td>-.131 (.963)</td>
<td>-1.137*** (.430)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.748*** (.584)</td>
<td>-5.354*** (1.093)</td>
<td>-4.072*** (.659)</td>
<td>-7.853*** (1.682)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-.230.094</td>
<td>-.71.054</td>
<td>-.224.483</td>
<td>-.64.339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald x²</td>
<td>132.29</td>
<td>163.13</td>
<td>106.79</td>
<td>137.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.2637</td>
<td>0.3210</td>
<td>0.2518</td>
<td>0.3345</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Cell entries are logit coefficients. Robust standard errors, which are adjusted for clustering on the intrastate dispute, are in parentheses. Significance levels: *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01; one-tailed tests. a – dropped due to lack of variance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1 (Intervention)</th>
<th>Model 2 (Intermediary)</th>
<th>Model 3 (Participatory)</th>
<th>Model 4 (Military)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War Involvement</td>
<td>−.140 (.588)</td>
<td>.376 (.600)</td>
<td>−1.137 (1.036)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Proximity</td>
<td>−.440 (.735)</td>
<td>−.578 (1.128)</td>
<td>−.636 (1.033)</td>
<td>1.540 (1.448)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Status</td>
<td>1.466* (1.132)</td>
<td>.311 (1.051)</td>
<td>2.295*** (.952)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Linkage</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Linkage</td>
<td>.680 (.567)</td>
<td>1.868*** (.764)</td>
<td>−.037 (.814)</td>
<td>.179 (.770)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Linkage</td>
<td>.455 (.437)</td>
<td>1.000** (.562)</td>
<td>.076 (.582)</td>
<td>3.088*** (1.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary Intervention</td>
<td>−.002 (.551)</td>
<td>−.231 (.690)</td>
<td>−.226 (.613)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Democracy</td>
<td>.400 (.445)</td>
<td>−.911* (.571)</td>
<td>1.126** (.564)</td>
<td>.662 (1.665)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversionary Intervention</td>
<td>−.243 (.554)</td>
<td>−.391 (.978)</td>
<td>.132 (.588)</td>
<td>.031 (1.192)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Weariness</td>
<td>−.232 (.394)</td>
<td>.049 (.598)</td>
<td>−.601* (.432)</td>
<td>1.587** (0.908)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Election</td>
<td>−.409 (.436)</td>
<td>−.634 (.600)</td>
<td>−.390 (.502)</td>
<td>−.764 (1.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midterm Election</td>
<td>−.318 (.402)</td>
<td>−.416 (.510)</td>
<td>−.289 (.513)</td>
<td>.632 (1.107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified Government</td>
<td>.222 (.534)</td>
<td>.442 (.737)</td>
<td>−.224 (.590)</td>
<td>−.676 (1.299)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis</td>
<td>.961* (.514)</td>
<td>−.471 (.662)</td>
<td>1.472*** (.524)</td>
<td>1.497 (1.371)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>.521 (.406)</td>
<td>.292 (.497)</td>
<td>1.232** (.485)</td>
<td>.461 (0.896)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Intervention</td>
<td>1.393*** (.468)</td>
<td>1.164** (.560)</td>
<td>1.396*** (.539)</td>
<td>.976 (0.841)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>−.117 (.438)</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>−.345 (.489)</td>
<td>.940 (0.972)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>.774** (.373)</td>
<td>1.036** (.448)</td>
<td>.452 (.442)</td>
<td>−.213 (0.673)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia/Pacific</td>
<td>.352 (.777)</td>
<td>.613 (1.025)</td>
<td>−.067 (.874)</td>
<td>.639 (1.735)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>.549 (.737)</td>
<td>.947 (.847)</td>
<td>.009 (.807)</td>
<td>.042 (0.978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>.544 (.782)</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>.701 (.815)</td>
<td>.486 (1.145)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>.421 (.706)</td>
<td>.845 (.905)</td>
<td>−.219 (.725)</td>
<td>−1.191 (1.356)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Constant</td>
<td>−2.897*** (.875)</td>
<td>−3.433*** (1.067)</td>
<td>−3.211*** (.972)</td>
<td>−8.174*** (2.599)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>−125.56</td>
<td>−73.632</td>
<td>−103.541</td>
<td>−32.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald χ²</td>
<td>36.99</td>
<td>59.26</td>
<td>70.67</td>
<td>79.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.1262</td>
<td>0.2120</td>
<td>0.1502</td>
<td>0.2327</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Cell entries are logit coefficients. Robust standard errors, which are adjusted for clustering on the intrastate dispute, are in parentheses. Significance levels: *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01; one-tailed tests. a – dropped due to lack of variance.
that only one domestic factor — namely “unified government” or the absence of “divided government” — significantly influences the decisions of the United States to intervene in a partisan manner in intrastate disputes. These results suggest, perhaps contrary to conventional wisdom, that international factors are more important than domestic factors when it comes to influencing U.S. intervention decisions. Indeed, decisions by the U.S. to intervene militarily or nonmilitarily may have little to do with domestic economic, political, or social factors.\footnote{Finally, the results suggest that the effect of both domestic factors and international factors differs depending on the specific type of intervention. In some cases, international or domestic factors influence U.S. intermediary intervention decisions differently than U.S. participatory or military interventions. We also found that while there are many similarities between the Cold War period and post-Cold War period, there are some significant differences in the effects of international and domestic factors on the likelihood of U.S. intervention during these two periods.}

What are the implications of this study in terms of research on state interventions in general and U.S. interventions in particular? First, the results of this study suggest that regardless of their particular domestic political or economic situations, states may be influenced to intervene or constrained from intervening largely by international factors. Future studies of state intervention should expand the analysis of motivations of intervention to states other than just the U.S. or major global powers. It is possible, given the global responsibilities assumed by major powers, that international factors are relatively more important for major powers than for non-major powers in the international system. In any event, future studies should examine the extent to which there are significant differences in the motivations of powerful states and less powerful states to intervene overseas. Second, the results suggest both strategic (power-related) and nonstrategic (affective- or humanitarian-related) factors at the international level of analysis are important. Future studies of state interventions should include both types of international influences. Finally, the results of this study pointed to the possibility that the influence of particular international factors may vary across different categories of interventions and across different time periods. Indeed, future research on state interventions should be broadened beyond analyses of military interventions, and such studies should also differentiate between intermediary and participatory interventions.

CONTRIBUTORS

Mark J. Mullenbach is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Arkansas. His recent research on conflict management and peacekeeping has been published in the International Studies Quarterly.
NOTES

1. In this study, we define “intervention” as diplomatic, economic, or military involvement by a third party in a political dispute between two states, or two groups within a state, for the purpose of assisting one of the parties to prevail in the dispute (participatory or partisan intervention) or for the purpose of assisting both parties to manage or resolve the dispute without taking sides (intermediary or nonpartisan intervention).

2. Examples of nonpartisan interventions include ceasefire appeals, fact-finding, mediation, peacekeeping, election monitoring, and humanitarian assistance, while examples of partisan interventions include condemnations, economic assistance, military sanctions, and use of military force in support of or against one of the parties to a dispute.

3. For example, see Hermann and Kegley, 1996; James and Oneal, 1991; Meernik, 1996; Meernik and Waterman, 1996; Morgan and Bickers, 1992; Odell, 1974; Ostrom and Job, 1986; Stoll, 1984; Weede, 1978; Yoon, 1997.

4. John W. Eley (1972, p. 255) stated that the “necessity of dealing with the range of interventionary behavior is particularly clear in any effort to explain the factors underlying intervention.”

5. According to the Migration Information Source, there were some 420,000 foreign-born Haitians living in the U.S., including 182,000 living in Florida. <http://www.migrationinformation.org/USFocus/display.cfm?ID=214>

6. In his discussion of the systemic determinants of the opportunities for intervention, Oran R. Young (1968, p. 180) argued that “the more extensive the disparities in power, the greater the opportunities for intervention among actors in the international system,” and that when the distribution of power among actors in the international system are relatively equal, the “resultant clashes are apt to take the form of direct confrontation between actors rather than intervention by some actors in the internal affairs of others.”

7. Rajat Ganguly and Ray Taras (1998, p. 75) suggested that third-party actors may intervene in an intrastate dispute for both affective motives (reasons of justice, humanitarian considerations, ethnic, religious, racial, or ideological affinity with one of the disputants) and instrumental motives (international political considerations, short-term and long-term economic motives, and domestic motives).

8. For a thorough discussion of the war weariness hypothesis in the international relations literature, see Levy and Morgan, 1986.

9. The data sets of the Third-Party Interventions in Intrastate Disputes (TPI-Intrastate Disputes) Project are located at: <http://faculty.uca.edu/~markm/tpi_homepage.htm>

10. Frank L. Sherman (1994) earlier developed a similar set of phases, including dispute, conflict, hostilities, post-hostilities conflict, post-hostilities dispute, and settlement. Sherman’s conceptual framework was based on research originally done by Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss (1969).

11. The 410 cases of U.S. intervention include all “unilateral interventions” and “multilateral interventions” involving U.S. civilian or military personnel conducted under the auspices and authority of the U.S. government. However, the cases do not include interventions involving U.S. personnel (military or civilian) conducted under the auspices and authority of the United Nations or a regional intergovernmental organization or interventions involving U.S. personnel conducted under the auspices and authority of a nongovernmental organization.


14. The “adversaries” of the United States between January 1, 1945 and December 31, 2002 include the following countries: USSR/Russia (April 15, 1946–March 13, 1986); China (February 16,


17. Alternative periods of time (e.g., one year and ten years) are also tested in the models.


19. One of the alternative measurements of war weariness (coded “1” if the dispute phase began within one year of the end of a major war; coded “0” otherwise) does result in statistically significant coefficients at the .10 level; however, the other alternative measurement (coded “1” if the dispute phase began within ten years of the end of a major war; coded “0” otherwise) does not result in statistically significant coefficients at any level. Therefore, there is evidence of a short-term effect (one year), but there is not evidence of a medium-term effect (five years) or long-term effect (ten years).

20. The results from this study are generally inconsistent with those of James and Oneal (1991, p. 325) who found that domestic political factors were more important influences on decisions by presidents to use military force than international factors. However, the results are generally consistent with the findings of Meernik and Waterman (1996, p. 587) who concluded that “presidents are not motivated by domestic conditions when determining whether to use military force during an international crisis.”

REFERENCES


Deciding to Intervene


