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From On Interpretation §1,
Part 9
In the case of that which is or which has taken place, propositions, whether
positive or negative, must be true or false. Again, in the case of a pair of
contradictories, either when the subject is universal and the propositions
are of a universal character, or when it is individual, as has been said,'
one of the two must be true and the other false; whereas when the subject is
universal, but the propositions are not of a universal character, there is no
such necessity. We have discussed this type also in a previous chapter.
When the subject, however, is individual, and that which is predicated of it
relates to the future, the case is altered. For if all propositions whether
positive or negative are either true or false, then any given predicate must
either belong to the subject or not, so that if one man affirms that an event
of a given character will take place and another denies it, it is plain that
the statement of the one will correspond with reality and that of the other
will not. For the predicate cannot both belong and not belong to the subject
at one and the same time with regard to the future.
Thus, if it is true to say that a thing is white, it must necessarily be
white; if the reverse proposition is true, it will
of necessity not be white. Again, if it is white, the proposition stating
that it is white was true; if it is not white, the proposition to the
opposite effect was true. And if it is not white, the man who states that it
is making a false statement; and if the man who states that it is white is
making a false statement, it follows that it is not white. It may therefore
be argued that it is necessary that affirmations or denials must be either
true or false.
Now if this be so, nothing is or takes place
fortuitously, either in the present or in the future, and there are no real
alternatives; everything takes place of necessity and is fixed. For either he
that affirms that it will take place or he that denies this is in
correspondence with fact, whereas if things did not take place of necessity,
an event might just as easily not happen as happen; for the meaning of the
word 'fortuitous' with regard to present or future events is that reality is
so constituted that it may issue in either of two opposite directions. Again,
if a thing is white now, it was true before to say that it would be white, so
that of anything that has taken place it was always true to say 'it is' or
'it will be'. But if it was always true to say that a thing is or will be, it
is not possible that it should not be or not be about to be, and when a thing
cannot not come to be, it is impossible that it should not come to be, and
when it is impossible that it should not come to be, it must come to be. All,
then, that is about to be must of necessity take place. It results from this
that nothing is uncertain or fortuitous, for if it were fortuitous it would
not be necessary.
Again, to say that neither the affirmation nor the denial is true,
maintaining, let us say, that an event neither will take place nor will not
take place, is to take up a position impossible to defend. In the first
place, though facts should prove the one proposition false, the opposite
would still be untrue. Secondly, if it was true to say that a thing was both
white and large, both these qualities must necessarily belong to it; and if
they will belong to it the next day, they must necessarily belong to it the
next day. But if an event is neither to take place nor not to take place the
next day, the element of chance will be eliminated. For example, it would be
necessary that a sea-fight should neither take place nor fail to take place
on the next day.
These awkward results and others of the same kind follow, if it is an
irrefragable law that of every pair of contradictory propositions, whether
they have regard to universals and are stated as universally applicable, or
whether they have regard to individuals, one must be true and the other
false, and that there are no real alternatives, but that all that is or takes
place is the outcome of necessity. There would be no need to deliberate or to
take trouble, on the supposition that if we should adopt a certain course, a
certain result would follow, while, if we did not, the result would not
follow. For a man may predict an event ten thousand years beforehand, and
another may predict the reverse; that which was truly predicted at the moment
in the past will of necessity take place in the fullness of time.
Further, it makes no difference whether people have or have not actually made
the contradictory statements. For it is manifest that the circumstances are
not influenced by the fact of an affirmation or denial on the part of anyone.
For events will not take place or fail to take place because it was stated
that they would or would not take place, nor is this any more the case if the
prediction dates back ten thousand years or any other space of time.
Wherefore, if through all time the nature of things was so constituted that a
prediction about an event was true, then through all time it was necessary
that that should find fulfillment; and with regard to all events,
circumstances have always been such that their occurrence is a matter of
necessity. For that of which someone has said truly that it will be, cannot
fail to take place; and of that which takes place, it was always true to say
that it would be.
Yet this view leads to an impossible conclusion; for we see that both
deliberation and action are causative with regard to the future, and that, to
speak more generally, in those things which are not continuously actual there
is potentiality in either direction. Such things may either be or not be;
events also therefore may either take place or not take place. There are many
obvious instances of this. It is possible that this coat may be cut in half,
and yet it may not be cut in half, but wear out
first. In the same way, it is possible that it should not be cut in half;
unless this were so, it would not be possible that it should wear out first.
So it is therefore with all other events which possess this kind of
potentiality. It is therefore plain that it is not of necessity that
everything is or takes place; but in some instances there are real
alternatives, in which case the affirmation is no more true and no more false
than the denial; while some exhibit a predisposition and general tendency in
one direction or the other, and yet can issue in the opposite direction by
exception.
Now that which is must needs be when it is, and that which is not must needs not be when it is not. Yet it cannot be said
without qualification that all existence and non-existence is the outcome of
necessity. For there is a difference between saying that that which is, when
it is, must needs be, and simply saying that all that is must needs be, and
similarly in the case of that which is not. In the case, also, of two
contradictory propositions this holds good. Everything must either be or not
be, whether in the present or in the future, but it is not always possible to
distinguish and state determinately which of these alternatives must
necessarily come about.
Let me illustrate. A sea-fight must either take place to-morrow or not, but
it is not necessary that it should take place to-morrow, neither is it
necessary that it should not take place, yet it is necessary that it either
should or should not take place to-morrow. Since propositions correspond with
facts, it is evident that when in future events there is
a real alternative, and a potentiality in contrary directions, the
corresponding affirmation and denial have the same character.
This is the case with regard to that which is not always existent or not
always nonexistent. One of the two propositions in such instances must be
true and the other false, but we cannot say determinately that this or that
is false, but must leave the alternative undecided. One may indeed be more
likely to be true than the other, but it cannot be either actually true or
actually false. It is therefore plain that it is not necessary that of an
affirmation and a denial one should be true and the other false. For in the
case of that which exists potentially, but not actually, the rule which
applies to that which exists actually does not hold good. The case is rather
as we have indicated.
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1
Since virtue is concerned with passions and actions, and on voluntary
passions and actions praise and blame are bestowed, on those that are
involuntary pardon, and sometimes also pity, to distinguish the voluntary and
the involuntary is presumably necessary for those who are studying the nature
of virtue, and useful also for legislators with a view to the assigning both
of honours and of punishments. Those things, then,
are thought-involuntary, which take place under compulsion or owing to
ignorance; and that is compulsory of which the moving principle is outside,
being a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person who is acting
or is feeling the passion, e.g. if he were to be carried somewhere by a wind,
or by men who had him in their power.
But with regard to the things that are done from fear of greater evils or for
some noble object (e.g. if a tyrant were to order one to do something base,
having one's parents and children in his power, and if one did the action
they were to be saved, but otherwise would be put to death), it may be
debated whether such actions are involuntary or voluntary. Something of the
sort happens also with regard to the throwing of goods overboard in a storm;
for in the abstract no one throws goods away voluntarily, but on condition of
its securing the safety of himself and his crew any sensible man does so.
Such actions, then, are mixed, but are more like voluntary actions; for they
are worthy of choice at the time when they are done, and the end of an action
is relative to the occasion. Both the terms, then, 'voluntary' and
'involuntary', must be used with reference to the moment of action. Now the
man acts voluntarily; for the principle that moves the instrumental parts of
the body in such actions is in him, and the things of which the moving
principle is in a man himself are in his power to do or not to do. Such
actions, therefore, are voluntary, but in the abstract perhaps involuntary;
for no one would choose any such act in itself.
For such actions men are sometimes even praised, when they endure something
base or painful in return for great and noble objects gained; in the opposite
case they are blamed, since to endure the greatest indignities for no noble
end or for a trifling end is the mark of an inferior person. On some actions
praise indeed is not bestowed, but pardon is, when one does what he ought not under pressure which overstrains human nature
and which no one could withstand. But some acts, perhaps, we cannot be forced
to do, but ought rather to face death after the most fearful sufferings; for
the things that 'forced' Euripides Alcmaeon to slay
his mother seem absurd. It is difficult sometimes to determine what should be
chosen at what cost, and what should be endured in return for what gain, and
yet more difficult to abide by our decisions; for as a rule what is expected
is painful, and what we are forced to do is base, whence praise and blame are
bestowed on those who have been compelled or have not.
What sort of acts, then, should be called compulsory? We answer that without
qualification actions are so when the cause is in the external circumstances
and the agent contributes nothing. But the things that in themselves are
involuntary, but now and in return for these gains are worthy of choice, and
whose moving principle is in the agent, are in themselves involuntary, but
now and in return for these gains voluntary. They are more like voluntary
acts; for actions are in the class of particulars, and the particular acts
here are voluntary. What sort of things are to be chosen, and in return for
what, it is not easy to state; for there are many differences in the
particular cases.
But if some one were to say that pleasant and noble
objects have a compelling power, forcing us from without, all acts would be
for him compulsory; for it is for these objects that all men do everything
they do. And those who act under compulsion and unwillingly act with pain,
but those who do acts for their pleasantness and nobility do them with
pleasure; it is absurd to make external circumstances responsible, and not
oneself, as being easily caught by such attractions, and to make oneself
responsible for noble acts but the pleasant objects responsible for base
acts. The compulsory, then, seems to be that whose moving principle is
outside, the person compelled contributing nothing.
Everything that is done by reason of ignorance is not voluntary; it is only
what produces pain and repentance that is involuntary. For the man who has done
something owing to ignorance, and feels not the least vexation at his action,
has not acted voluntarily, since he did not know what he was doing, nor yet
involuntarily, since he is not pained. Of people, then, who act by reason of
ignorance he who repents is thought an involuntary agent, and the man who
does not repent may, since he is different, be called a not voluntary agent;
for, since he differs from the other, it is better that he should have a name
of his own.
Acting by reason of ignorance seems also to be different from acting in
ignorance; for the man who is drunk or in a rage is thought to act as a
result not of ignorance but of one of the causes mentioned, yet not knowingly
but in ignorance.
Now every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and what he ought to
abstain from, and it is by reason of error of this kind that men become
unjust and in general bad; but the term 'involuntary' tends to be used not if
a man is ignorant of what is to his advantage- for it is not mistaken purpose
that causes involuntary action (it leads rather to wickedness), nor ignorance
of the universal (for that men are blamed), but ignorance of particulars,
i.e. of the circumstances of the action and the objects with which it is
concerned. For it is on these that both pity and pardon depend, since the
person who is ignorant of any of these acts involuntarily.
Perhaps it is just as well, therefore, to determine their nature and number.
A man may be ignorant, then, of who he is, what he is doing, what or whom he
is acting on, and sometimes also what (e.g. what instrument) he is doing it
with, and to what end (e.g. he may think his act will conduce to some one's
safety), and how he is doing it (e.g. whether gently or violently). Now of
all of these no one could be ignorant unless he were
mad, and evidently also he could not be ignorant of the agent; for how could
he not know himself? But of what he is doing a man might be ignorant, as for
instance people say 'it slipped out of their mouths as they were speaking',
or 'they did not know it was a secret', as Aeschylus said of the mysteries,
or a man might say he 'let it go off when he merely wanted to show its
working', as the man did with the catapult. Again, one might think one's son
was an enemy, as Merope did, or that a pointed
spear had a button on it, or that a stone was pumicestone;
or one might give a man a draught to save him, and really kill him; or one
might want to touch a man, as people do in sparring, and really wound him.
The ignorance may relate, then, to any of these things, i.e. of the
circumstances of the action, and the man who was ignorant of any of these is
thought to have acted involuntarily, and especially if he was ignorant on the
most important points; and these are thought to be
the circumstances of the action and its end. Further, the doing of an act
that is called involuntary in virtue of ignorance of this sort must be
painful and involve repentance.
Since that which is done under compulsion or by reason of ignorance is
involuntary, the voluntary would seem to be that of which the moving
principle is in the agent himself, he being aware of the particular
circumstances of the action. Presumably acts done by reason of anger or
appetite are not rightly called involuntary. For in the first place, on that
showing none of the other animals will act voluntarily, nor will children;
and secondly, is it meant that we do not do voluntarily any of the acts that
are due to appetite or anger, or that we do the noble acts voluntarily and
the base acts involuntarily? Is not this absurd, when one and the same thing
is the cause? But it would surely be odd to describe as involuntary the
things one ought to desire; and we ought both to be angry at certain things
and to have an appetite for certain things, e.g. for health and for learning.
Also what is involuntary is thought to be painful, but what is in accordance
with appetite is thought to be pleasant. Again, what is the difference in
respect of involuntariness between errors committed upon calculation and those
committed in anger? Both are to be avoided, but the irrational passions are
thought not less human than reason is, and therefore also the actions which
proceed from anger or appetite are the man's actions. It would be odd, then,
to treat them as involuntary.
2
Both the voluntary and the involuntary having been delimited, we must next
discuss choice; for it is thought to be most closely bound up with virtue and
to discriminate characters better than actions do.
Choice, then, seems to be voluntary, but not the same thing as the voluntary;
the latter extends more widely. For both children and the lower animals share
in voluntary action, but not in choice, and acts done on the spur of the
moment we describe as voluntary, but not as chosen.
Those who say it is appetite or anger or wish or a kind of opinion do not
seem to be right. For choice is not common to irrational creatures as well,
but appetite and anger are. Again, the incontinent man acts with appetite,
but not with choice; while the continent man on the contrary acts with
choice, but not with appetite. Again, appetite is contrary to choice, but not
appetite to appetite. Again, appetite relates to the pleasant and the
painful, choice neither to the painful nor to the pleasant.
Still less is it anger; for acts due to anger are thought to be less than any
others objects of choice.
But neither is it wish, though it seems near to it; for choice cannot relate
to impossibles, and if any one said he chose them
he would be thought silly; but there may be a wish even for impossibles, e.g. for immortality. And wish may relate to
things that could in no way be brought about by one's own efforts, e.g. that
a particular actor or athlete should win in a competition; but no one chooses
such things, but only the things that he thinks could be brought about by his
own efforts. Again, wish relates rather to the end, choice to the means; for
instance, we wish to be healthy, but we choose the acts which will make us
healthy, and we wish to be happy and say we do, but we cannot well say we
choose to be so; for, in general, choice seems to relate to the things that
are in our own power.
For this reason, too, it cannot be opinion; for opinion is thought to relate
to all kinds of things, no less to eternal things and impossible things than
to things in our own power; and it is distinguished by its falsity or truth,
not by its badness or goodness, while choice is distinguished rather by
these.
Now with opinion in general perhaps no one even says it is identical. But it
is not identical even with any kind of opinion; for by choosing what is good
or bad we are men of a certain character, which we are not by holding certain
opinions. And we choose to get or avoid something good or bad, but we have
opinions about what a thing is or whom it is good for or how it is good for
him; we can hardly be said to opine to get or avoid anything. And choice is
praised for being related to the right object rather than for being rightly
related to it, opinion for being truly related to its object. And we choose
what we best know to be good, but we opine what we
do not quite know; and it is not the same people that are thought to make the
best choices and to have the best opinions, but some are thought to have
fairly good opinions, but by reason of vice to choose what they should not.
If opinion precedes choice or accompanies it, that makes no difference; for
it is not this that we are considering, but whether it is identical with some
kind of opinion.
What, then, or what kind of thing is it, since it is none of the things we
have mentioned? It seems to be voluntary, but not all that is voluntary to be
an object of choice. Is it, then, what has been decided on by previous
deliberation? At any rate choice involves a rational principle and thought.
Even the name seems to suggest that it is what is chosen before other things.
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