|
Eichmann, the Banality of Evil, and Thinking in Arendt's
Thought* By Bethania Assy (from the”Paideia Project on-line” at http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Cont/ContAssy.htm) ABSTRACT: I analyze the ways in which the
faculty of thinking can avoid evil action, taking into account Hannah
Arendt's discussion regarding the banality of evil and thoughtlessness in
connection with the Eichmann trial. I focus on the following question posed
by Arendt: "Could the activity of thinking as such, the habit of
examining and reflecting upon whatever happens to come to pass, regardless of
specific content and quite independent of results, could this activity be of
such a nature that it 'conditions' men against evildoing?" Examples of
the connection between evildoing and thinking include the distinction between
the commonplace and the banal, and the absence of the depth characteristic of
banality and the necessity of thinking as the means for depth. I then focus
upon Arendt's model thinker (Socrates) and argue that the faculty of thinking
works to avoid evildoing by utilizing the Socratic principle of
noncontradiction. * * *
"What
is the subject of our thought? Experience! Nothing else!" (1)
(Hannah Arendt) Eichmann
in Arendt's
first reaction to Eichmann, "the man in the glass booth," was — nicht
einmal unheimlich — not even sinister." (4) She argues that
"The deeds were monstrous, but the doer ... was quite ordinary,
commonplace, and neither demonic nor monstrous." (5) Arendt's perception
that Eichmann seemed to be a common man, evidenced in his transparent
superficiality and mediocrity left her astonished in measuring the
unaccounted evil committed by him, that is, organizing the deportation of
millions of Jews to the concentration camps. Actually, what Arendt had
detected in Eichmann was not even stupidity, in her words, he portrayed
something entirely negative, it was thoughtlessness. Eichmann's
ordinariness implied in an incapacity for independent critical thought:
"... the only specific characteristic one could detect in his past as
well as in his behavior during the trial and the preceding police examination
was something entirely negative: it was not stupidity but a curious, quite authentic
inability to think." (6) (emphasis added) Eichmann became the protagonist
of a kind of experience apparently so quotidian, the absence of the critical
thought. Arendt says: "When confronted with situations for which such
routine procedures did not exist, he [Eichmann] was helpless, and his
cliché-ridden language produced on the stand, as it had evidently done in his
official life, a kind of macabre comedy. Clichés, stock phrases, adherence to
conventional, standardized codes of expression and conduct have the socially
recognized function of protecting us against reality, that is, against the
claim on our thinking attention that all events and facts make by virtue of
their existence." (7) Eichmann
had always acted according to the restrict limits allowed by the laws and
ordinances. Those attitudes resulted in the clouding between virtues and
vices of a blind obedience. In fact, it was not only Eichmann, as an isolated
person, who was normal, whereas all other bureaucrats were sadist monsters.
One was before a bureaucratic compact mass of men who were perfectly normal,
but whose acts were monstrous. Behind such terrible normality of the
bureaucratic mass, who was able to commit the greatest atrocities that the
world has even seen, Arendt addressed the question of the banality of evil.
This normality opened up the precedent regarding the possibility that some
attitudes commonly repudiated by a society — in this case the Nazi German
attitudes — find as a locus of manifestation the common citizen, who
has not reflected on the content of the rules. Richard Bernstein highlights
this "normal and ordinary behavior" of the bureaucratic mass in not
thinking about the real meaning of the rules themselves, in the sense that
they would behave in the same manner in the manufacturing of either food or
corpses. "We may find it almost impossible to image how someone could
'think'(or rather, not think) in this manner, whereby manufacturing food,
bombs, or corpses are 'in essence the same' and where this can become
'normal', 'ordinary' behavior. This is the mentality that Arendt believed she
was facing in Eichmann... ." (8) Eichmann has brought up the radical
danger of "such remoteness from reality and such thoughtlessness."
(9) II Subsequently,
it seems that the Arendtian portrait of a banal Eichmann has become more than
a lesson, as Arendt maintained against those who had affirmed that the
banality of evil implied a theorization about the phenomenon of evil. (10)
The banality of evil has accentuated the whole relationship among the faculty
of thinking, the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, the faculty
of judgment, and their moral implications, tasks that have been extremely
significant in Arendt's work since her first writings in the late 1940s about
the phenomenon of the Totalitarianism. The
apex of detachment of Eichmann's mind between the reality of such events, and
a logical process able (11) "to wrest" his speech and thought was
described then by Arendt in the final moment of Eichmann's death. Eichmann
was incapable of articulating anything other than what he had heard all his
life, in such a way that "...these 'lofty words' should completely
becloud the reality of his own death." (12) With such description,
Arendt for the first time utilizes the term banality of evil : "It was
as though in those last minutes he was summing up the lesson that this long
course in human wickedness had taught us — the lesson of the fearsome,
word-and-thought-denying banality of evil." (13) (emphasis added)
Such a "lesson," whose potentiality denies word and thought, did
not seem to frame the usual standards of evil, such as pathology,
self-interest, and ideological conviction of the doer, and so one. Almost 10
years after Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt reaffirms in Thinking and
Moral Considerations this same dimension of evil: "... the
phenomenon of evil deeds, committed on a gigantic scale, which could not be
traced to any particularity of wickedness, pathology, or ideological
conviction in the doer, whose only personal distinction was a perhaps
extraordinary shallowness." (14) Arendt stressed a kind of phenomenon in
which the doer exposes an impressive superficiality, in which Eichmann became
the factual example. With the following question Arendt substantially
circumscribes the main delineation in which the banality of evil will be the
result: "Could the activity of thinking as such, the habit of
examining and reflecting upon whatever happens to come to pass, regardless of
specific content and quite independent of results, could this activity be
of such a nature that it 'conditions' men against evil-doing?" (15)
(emphasis added) In
other words, does the faculty of thinking, in its intrinsic nature and
attributes, involve the possibility of avoiding evil-doing? At least in
"border situations"? In 1946, Arendt had already mentioned the deep
meaning of experiences through which the reality became an urgent element for
the philosophical task in modernity. Arendt takes Jasper's expression
"border situations" to describe such incalculable and unforeseeable
situations in which the man is forced to think. The
banality of evil, whose potentiality denies word and thought, did not seem to
frame the usual standards of evil, such as pathology of evil, self-interest,
ideological conviction of the doer, intentional evil, or even an obstinate
set of ideas that had impelled him to evil and so one. Eichmann portrayed the
factual example of a kind of evil manifestation that was not found in the
traditional dimensions. In this sense, Arendt raises the question about
whether such traditional dimensions of evil are a necessary condition of
evil-doing. Has the phenomenon of evil necessarily a volitive root? Or, in
other words, has the imperative condition to the evil-doing been the evil
based on traditional foundations? It was undeniable that this new whole of
questions about the phenomenon of evil, whose roots were not anchored in the
philosophical, moral, religious traditional standards, at least will open a
new perspective on the understanding of evil. Such notion was mentioned by
Arendt in the first pages of The Life of the Mind's introduction:
"Behind that phrase [banality of evil], I held no thesis or
doctrine, although I was dimly aware of the fact that it went counter to our
tradition of thought — literary, theological, or philosophic — about the
phenomenon of Evil." (16) Evil as a demoniac portion like Lucifer, the
falling angel, mentioned by the religious tradition; the evil mobilized by
weakness, envy, or even the hate that evil feels by Good, exemplified in the
literary tradition in Shakespeare; for Arendt all of them cannot explain what
had happened in Nazi Germany, brought into light by Eichmann. Arendt says:
"... I felt was shocking because it contradicts our theories about
evil,..." (17) The perplexity before a phenomenon that contradicted the
known theories about evil, and the clear relationship between the problem of
evil and the faculty of thinking, were what Arendt have pointed out by the
expression the banality of evil. In
a correspondence with Grafton, in 1963, Arendt distinguishes between banal
and commonplace with regard to the banality of evil. Arendt says: "For
me, there is a very important difference: 'commonplace' is what frequently,
commonly happens, but something can be banal even if it is not common."
(18) Banal does not presuppose that the evil has a commonplace in everyone.
Evil can become banal even if evil itself is not trivial to anyone. Thus,
banality of evil does not mean that the evil itself is trivial and common to
everybody. This distinction between commonplace and banal is clear in a
conference organized on her work in Arendt
emphasizes that the absence of critical thinking was common among
"Eichmanns." Such absence could directly affect the evil-doing that
became banal by the fact that this block of Eichmanns did not exercise their
capacity of thinking. Thus, for Arendt, it is not true that "there is an
Eichmann in each one of us," and that the banality of evil has a
commonplace in each of us. In fact, there was a deep inclination of a whole
society to not exercise the faculty of thinking. Even in Eichmann in
Jerusalem Arendt says: "... if this is 'banal' and even
funny, if with the best will in the world one cannot extract any diabolical
or demonic profundity from Eichmann, that is still far from calling it
commonplace" (20) (emphasis added) Let
us take another penetrating aspect related to the banality of evil: the
absence of roots. I would like to discuss two implications concerning the
meaning of "no-roots" in the banality of evil. Firstly, for Arendt,
such evil has no-roots in the sense that it has not-roots in any kind of
manifestation of evil presented by our tradition as a whole. In a draft
written for a debate about Eichmann in Jerusalem in Hofstra College in
1964, Arendt accentuated that banality means: " 'No roots', not rooted
in 'evil motives' or 'urges' or strength of 'temptation' (human nature) or
'Evil be thou my good: Richard III' etc." (21) In another undated draft
she says: "Banality of Evil — ... Root-less, no demonic forces. Evil be
thou my good! No Radical Evil." (22) In The Life of the Mind Arendt
writes: "However, what I was confronted with was utterly different and
still undeniably factual. I was struck by a manifest shallowness in the doer that
made it impossible to trace the incontestable evil of his deeds to any deeper
level of roots or motives." (23) That means, the banality of evil
has, as a deep understanding, a notion of evil that has no roots in
"evil motives." (24) Secondly,
The notion that the banality of evil has "no-roots" is inherently
connected with Arendt's understanding that only the faculty of thinking can
reach the profundity, and consequently reach the roots. In one of the
clearest moments about this Arendt says: "I mean that evil is not
radical, going to the roots (radix), that is has no depth, and that for this
very reason it is so terribly difficult to think about it, since thinking,
by definition, wants to reach the roots. Evil is a surface phenomenon,
and instead of being radical, it is merely extreme. We resist evil by not
being swept away by the surface of things, by stopping ourselves and
beginning to think, that is, by reaching another dimension than the
horizon of everyday life. In other words, the more superficial someone is,
the more likely will he be to yield to evil. An indication of such
superficiality is the use of clichés, and Eichmann, ...was a perfect
example." (25) (emphasis added) Looking
for some profundity in Eichmann that could explain the roots of evil, Arendt
found an absence of evil motives, as if the evil was a superficial phenomenon
in opposition to the faculty of thinking, in which we necessarily reach
profundity. Since "... thinking, by definition, wants to reach the roots,"
the banality of evil, such evil without roots, can be understood essentially
by the resulting movement from thoughtlessness. Eichmann, by the fact that he
was not able to exercise the faculty of thinking, could not find any
profundity with regard to his deeds. Such aspects are mentioned by Arendt in
one of the most controversial statements in her correspondence with Gershom
Scholem. Arendt emphasizes that evil could spread "like a fungus on the
surface" mainly because there is no depth, and that solely stopping ,and
starting to think, can reach the depth. Arendt emphasizes: "It is indeed
my opinion now that evil is never 'radical', that it is only extreme, and
that it possesses neither depth nor any demonic dimension. It can overgrow
and lay waste the whole world precisely because it spreads like a fungus
on the surface. It is 'thought-defying', as I said, because thought
tries to reach some depth, to go to roots, and the moment it concerns itself
with evil, it is frustrated because there is nothing. That is its 'banality'.
Only the good has depth and can be radical." (26) (emphasis added) III "Thinking
is the only activity that needs nothing but itself for its exercise."
(27) (emphasis added) (Hannah Arendt) Let
us raise the question that comes naturally from the two former topic: How,
then, does the faculty of thinking work in order to avoid evil? First of all,
according to Arendt, the moral and ethic standards based on habits and
customs have shown that they can just be changed by a new set of rules of
behavior dictated by the current society. In Personal Responsibility under
Dictatorship, Arendt emphasizes: "It was as though morality, at the
very moment of its collapse within an old, highly civilized nation, stood
revealed in its original meaning, as a set of mores, of customs and manners,
which could be exchanged for another set with no more trouble than it would
take to change the table manners of a whole people." (28) Thenceforth,
Arendt claims the bridge between morality and the faculty of thinking. In
this same article quoted above she asks how is was possible that few persons
resisted the moral collapse and had not adhered to the regime, despite any
coercion. Arendt herself answers: "The answer to the ...question is
relatively simple. The nonparticipants, called irresponsible by the majority,
were the only ones who dared judge by themselves, and they were
capable of doing so not because they disposed of a better system of values or
because the old standards of right and wrong were still firmly planted in
their mind and conscience but, ... because their conscience did not function
in this, as were, automatic way, ... they asked themselves to what an extent
they would still be able to live in peace with themselves after having
committed certain deeds; and they decided that it would be better to do
nothing, not because the world would then be charged for the better, but
because only on this condition could they go on living with themselves."
(29) (emphasis added) Arendt
clearly attributes to the faculty of thinking the presupposition for this
kind of judging extremely necessary in times of moral collapse, that is to
say, "when the chips are down." Arendt argues: "The
presupposition for this kind of judging is not a highly developed
intelligence or sophistication in moral matters, but merely the habit of
living together explicitly with oneself, that is, of being engaged in that
silent dialogue between me and myself which since Socrates and Plato we
usually call thinking." (30) (emphasis added) Arendt
enumerates three basic propositions that involve the faculty of thinking and
the problem of evil. First, one must presuppose that the faculty of thinking
is accessible to everyone, rather than the privilege of "professional
thinkers." Second, if the faculty of thinking, as we will see, has an
antagonistic result regarding solid axioms, then, one cannot expect that such
faculty builds any kind of moral foundation, or even, any moral commandment.
And finally, if the faculty of thinking concerns the invisible, it
consequently takes no place directly in the world of appearances. (31) Taking
into account these three presuppositions, Arendt asks how the faculty of
thinking can be relevant not only to the problem of evil, but also, to the
avoidance of evil-doing. Her answer would be indicative of the trajectory of
such a faculty, that is, only through the functioning of the faculty of
thinking, what for Arendt means: looking for the experiences of thought.
She says: "Inability to think is not stupidity; it can be found in
highly intelligent people, and wickedness is hardly its cause, if only
because thoughtlessness as well as stupidity are much more frequent
phenomena, is necessary to cause great evil... Hence, in Kantian terms, one
would need philosophy, the exercise of reason as the faculty of thought,
to prevent evil." (32) (emphasis added) In fact, Arendt has made
clear that after the experience of totalitarianism, we cannot walk upon the
firm soil of established moral standards. Rather, since this experience, we
have been confined to live in the company of ourselves, meaning by that that
we are condemned to the continuous examination of the events through our
activity of thinking. Describing
the faculty of thinking, Arendt takes the Kantian distinction between reason,
Vernunft, and intellect, Verstand. In a broad sense, the
former, as a faculty of thinking, aims at the conception of meaning, and
understanding; whereas, the latter, as a faculty of cognition, aims at the
apprehension through perceptions that are given by senses, objectifying a
verifiable knowledge. Thus, Arendt argues that the faculty of thinking is
related to the search for meaning pertaining to reason. The faculty of
thinking concerns meaning, and the necessity of understanding, rather than,
the search for truth, whose evidence is given by the senses, and thereby
pertains to the intellect. One
of Arendt's main concerns about the faculty of thinking was the fact that a
whole society can succumb to a total changing of its moral standards without
its citizens emitting any judgment about what has happened. Arendt
chooses Socrates as her model of thinker, "a citizen among
citizens," insofar Socrates thought "...simply for the right to go
about examining the opinions of other people, thinking about them and asking
his interlocutors to do the same." (33) Socratic thought follows an
aporetic movement, whose argumentation does not intend to achieve any concept
or definition about the inquired subject. Arendt had claimed that "If
there is anything in thinking that can prevent men from doing evil, it must
be some property inherent in the activity itself, regardless of its
objects." (34) Such a form of preventing evil is located in the process
of thinking itself. This Socratic movement of thinking provokes essentially
the perplexity, putting the established standards in movement, as if the
perplexity has the power to dislodge the individuals from their own dogmas
and rules of behavior. As if the faculty of thinking had the potentiality of
putting man in front of a blank painting, without good or evil, without right
or wrong, but simply activating in him the condition to establish dialogue
with himself, reflecting by himself, and deliberating by the faculty of
judging his own judgment about such events. Taking
the Socratic propositions, Arendt points out the only criterion that Socrates
attributes to the faculty of thinking: "agreement, to be consistent with
oneself, its opposite, to be in contradiction with oneself, actually means
becoming one's own adversary." (35) Even though the condition to the
thinking process is the two-in-one dialogue, the harmony of such dialogue is
essential to make one's own dialogue possible, that means, these two must be
friends. Because if the modus operandi of the thinking process takes
place in the form of a dialogue, to be in contradiction with yourselves, in
disagreement with yourselves, implies the acquisition of an adversary, taking
account that the self is also a kind of friend. The criterion of dialogue, by
its own nature, is the harmony that makes possible the dialectical process
throughout, so that, when one has disagreement with any partner, the dialogue
naturally interrupts. In regarding the faculty of thinking, in which we are
our own partner, the adversary becomes ourselves, in which the only form of
interruption is, consequently, to stop thinking, to stop provoking the
two-in-one dialogue. What
Arendt has pointed out in claiming such criterion of noncontradiction, as a sine
qua non condition for the thinking process, is to stress how dangerous
the deeds can be when the actor does not exercise the inner dialogue with
himself in order to examine the events in front of his eyes. Arendt is trying
to avoid adherence by men to any moral, social, or legal established
standards without exciting their capacity of reflect, of thinking, based on
an internal dialogue with themselves about the meaning of such happenings. The
thinking process, by its inner form of working, wants to reach the roots,
which compels meaning through remembrance. The banality of evil which
appeared through Eichmann made evident how superficial the phenomenon of evil
could show its face. The evil could spread out as fungus under the surface,
by a mass of citizens that did not reflect on events, did not ask for
significance, nor made a dialogue with themselves about their own deeds.
Arendt says: The greatest evildoers are those who don't remember because they
never given the matter a thought; nothing can keep them back because
without remembrance they are without roots. (36) In
other words, the manifestation of the winds of thought able to provoke
perplexity, dislodging the prejudices, at least in border situations, impels
men to exercise the faculty of thinking, of reflection, making them emit
their own judgment. Arendt argues that the man that exercises his faculty of
thinking is always his own witness of his deed: "I am may own witness
when I am acting. I know the agent and am condemned to live together with
him." (37) At
first glance, in taking Socrates as her model of thinker, it can be inferred
that such a model will be even helpful in destroying all rules of social
behavior. Nevertheless, in Arendt's view the result of the process of
thinking is not nihilism, on the contrary, nihilism springs by the wish to
find results independently from the necessity of the activity of thinking.
Although, Arendt has adverted that as the Socratic model of thinking does not
originate any standard, in the same sense, it represents a kind of danger.
However, at least in times when the chips are down, the absence of the
faculty of thinking can be far more dangerous. If the absence of thinking
protects individuals against the "danger" of the winds of thought,
the non-exercise of such a faculty can bring the "banality of
evil." The lesson was how easily individuals can adhere to new
standards, no matter whether such set of rules comports "thou shalt
kill," instead of "thou shalt not kill," insofar as such a new
set of code has its proper working logic. In Arendt's proposition, such a
lesson was the perplexity of how little the habit of reflecting with oneself,
thinking and judging, modern society had shown us. This lesson was the
banality of evil, making possible The Concentration Camps, a
devastating article wrote by Arendt in 1948. I
conclude this paper pointed out two fundamental implications of the faculty
of thinking. Firstly, the faculty of thinking in such emergent times "is
political by implication." Secondly, the faculty of thinking has a
deliberating effect upon the faculty of judging. This later proposition works
as an intentional open door, keeping in mind that the faculty of thinking and
the faculty judging are intrinsically connected, even though Arendt has left
our world without showing exactly how. Arendt writes: "If
thinking — the two-in-one of the soundless dialogue — actualizes the
difference within our identity as given in consciousness and thereby results
in conscience as its by-product, then judging, the by-product of the
liberating effect of thinking, realizes thinking, makes it manifest in the
world of appearances, where I am never alone and always too busy to be able
to think. The manifestation of the wind of thought is not knowledge; it is
the ability to tell right from wrong, beautiful form ugly. And this, at the
rare moments when the stakes are on the table, may indeed prevent
catastrophes, at least for the self. (38) Notes * This paper was
presented at the Seminar "Hannah Arendt's The Life of the Mind,"
taught by Prof. Richard Bernstein in the Department of Philosophy at New
School For Social Research in the spring/97. This paper was also a part of my
Master Thesis entitled "MIGHT THE PROBLEM OF EVIL BE CONNECTED WITH THE
ABSENCE OF THE FACULTY OF THINKING? The relationship between the Banality
of Evil and the Faculty of Thinking in Hannah Arendt," defended in
the summer of 1996 in (1) (emphasis added)
Hannah Arendt, "On Hannah Arendt." In Hannah Arendt: The
Recovery of the Public World, edited by Melvy A. Hill (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1979), p. 308, (hereafter cited as On Hannah Arendt). (2) Hannah Arendt, Eichmann
in (3) Eichmann was a
Gestapo's officer under the Himmler's command. He was not an high rank
officer, even though he was responsible by "the Jewish question," including
"the Final Solution." This means that he had the responsibility in
organizing the deportations and evacuations of Jews, including to bring them
directly to the camps of extermination. (4) Correspondence
between Hannah Arendt and Heinrich Blücher, April 15, 1961, (Hannah Arendt's
Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, unpublished).
Quoted from Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt - For Love of the World
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 329. (hereafter cited
as LW). (5) Hannah Arendt, The
Life of Mind - Thinking - Willing (New York-London: Ed. Harvest/HJB Book,
1978), p. 04 (hereafter cited as LM). (6) Hannah Arendt,
"Thinking and Moral Considerations: A Lecture," Social Research,
no. 38/3 (Fall 1970), p. 417, (hereafter cited as TMC). (7) LM., p.
04. (8) Richard
Bernstein, "Evil, Thinking, and Judging," in Hannah Arendt and
the Jewish Question (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996), p. 170. (9) EJ., p.
288. (10) In the
postscript Arendt clarifies that the banality of evil does not concern the
theorization about the ontological nature of the evil. She says: "... it
was a lesson, neither an explanation of the phenomenon nor a theory about it
[banal]." Arendt, Ibid., p. 288. (11) With regard to
this logical process see: Hannah Arendt, The Origins of
Totalitarianism-Anti-Semitism, Imperialism, Totalitarianism. (New
York/London: Ed.Harvest-HJB Book, 1979.) p. 473; Hannah Arendt, "On the
Nature of Totalitarianism." In Essays in Understanding 1930-1954.
(New York, San Diego and London: Harcourt Brace & Company, edited by
Jerome Kohn, 1994.) p. 356; Hannah Arendt, "Understanding and
Politics" In Essays in Understanding 1930-1954. (New York, San
Diego and London: Harcourt Brace & Company, edited by Jerome Kohn, 1994.)
p. 318; Margareth Canovan, Hannah Arendt - A Reinterpretation of Her
Political Thought. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p. 26. (12) EJ., p.
288. (13) Ibid., p. 252. (14) TMC, p.
417. (15) TMC, p.
418. (16) LM., p.
03. (17) The article
called Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship was published in The
Listener, (18) Hannah Arendt,
Correspondence between Grafton and Arendt, (September 19, 1963) draft,
Hannah Arendt's Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, p.
06. (hereafter cited as 'Arendt to Grafton'). (19) "On Hannah
Arendt," p. 308. (20) EJ, p.
288. (21) Hannah Arendt,
"Eichmann - Discussion with Enumeration of Topics" (22) Hannah ,
"Reflections after Eichmann Trial", undated, Hannah Arendt's
Papers, The Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 24820, container
60. (23) LM., 04. (24) For the
relationship between radical evil and the banality of evil concerning the
meaning of "evil motives" see Richard Bernstein, "From Radical
Evil to the Banality of Evil: From Superflousness to Thoughtlessness,"
in Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question (Cambridge: The MIT Press,
1996) pp. 137-53. (25) 'Arendt to
Grafton' 07. (26) Hannah, Arendt,
The Jew as Pariah - Jewish Identity and Politics in the Modern Age.
(New York: Grove Press, 1978), p. 251. (27) LM, p.
162. (28) 'Personal
Responsibility under Dictatorship II,' p. 205. (29) Ibid. (30) 'Ibid. (31) See, in this
regard, TMC, p. 425. (32) TMC, p.
423. (33) LM p.
168. (34) LM., p.
180. (35) (Protagoras,
339c.) LM p.186. (36) The first part
of the Morality Lectures 1995, given by Arendt at (37) Ibid., 024636. (38) LM., p.
193. Paideia Project on-line Twentieth World Congress of
Philosophy |