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A Letter
Concerning Toleration edited bits (1763) John
Locke The
toleration of those that differ from others in matters of religion is so
agreeable to the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and to the genuine reason of
mankind, that it seems monstrous for men to be so blind as not to perceive
the necessity and advantage of it in so clear a light. I will not here tax
the pride and ambition of some, the passion and uncharitable zeal of others.
. . . I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the
business of civil government from that of religion and to settle the just
bounds that lie between the one and the other. If this be not done, there can
be no end put to the controversies that will be always arising between those that
have, or at least pretend to The
commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for the
procuring, preserving, and advancing their own civil interests. Civil
interests I call life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the
possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and
the like. It
is the duty of the civil magistrate, by the impartial execution of equal
laws, to secure unto all the people in general and to every one of his
subjects in particular the just possession of these things belonging to this
life. If anyone presume to violate the laws of public justice and equity,
established for the preservation of those things, his presumption is to be
checked by the fear of punishment, consisting of the deprivation or
diminution of those civil interests, or goods, which otherwise he might and
ought to enjoy. But seeing no man does willingly suffer himself to be
punished by the deprivation of any part of his goods, and much less of his
liberty or life, therefore, is the magistrate armed with the force and
strength of all his subjects, in order to the punishment of those that
violate any other man's rights. Now
that the whole jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches only to these civil
concernments, and that all civil power, right and dominion, is bounded and
confined to the only care of promoting these things; and that it neither can
nor ought in any manner to be extended to the salvation of souls, these
following considerations seem unto me abundantly to demonstrate. First,
because the care of souls is not committed to the civil magistrate, any more
than to other men. It is not committed unto him, I say, by God; because it
appears not that God has ever given any such authority to one man over
another as to compel anyone to his religion. Nor can any such power be vested
in the magistrate by the consent of the people, because no man can so far abandon
the care of his own salvation as blindly to leave to the choice of any other,
whether prince or subject, to prescribe to him what faith or worship he shall
embrace. For no man can, if he would, conform his faith to the dictates of
another. All the life and power of true religion consist in the inward and
full persuasion of the mind; and faith is not faith without believing. . . . In
the second place, the care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate,
because his power consists only in outward force; but true and saving
religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without which nothing
can be acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the understanding, that
it cannot be compelled to the belief of anything by outward force. Confiscation
of estate, imprisonment, torments, nothing of that nature can have any such
efficacy as to make men change the inward judgement that they have framed of
things. . . . In
the third place, the care of the salvation of men's souls cannot belong to
the magistrate; because, though the rigour of laws and the force of penalties
were capable to convince and change men's minds, yet would not that help at
all to the salvation of their souls. . . .In the variety and contradiction of
opinions in religion, wherein the princes of the world are as much divided as
in their secular interests, the narrow way would be much straitened; one
country alone would be in the right, and all the rest of the world put under
an obligation of following their princes in the ways that lead to
destruction; and that which heightens the absurdity, and very ill suits the
notion of a Deity, men would owe their eternal happiness or misery to the
places of their nativity. . . . Let
us now consider what a church is. A church, then, I take to be a voluntary
society of men, joining themselves together of their own accord in order to
the public worshipping of God in such manner as they judge acceptable to Him,
and effectual to the salvation of their souls. I
say it is a free and voluntary society. Nobody is born a member of any
church; otherwise the religion of parents would descend unto children by the
same right of inheritance as their temporal estates, and everyone would hold
his faith by the same tenure he does his lands, than which nothing can be
imagined more absurd. . . . It
follows now that we consider what is the power of this church and unto what
laws it is subject. . . . The
end of a religious society (as has already been said) is the public worship
of God and, by means thereof, the acquisition of eternal life. All discipline
ought, therefore, to tend to that end, and all ecclesiastical laws to be
thereunto confined. Nothing ought nor can be transacted in this society
relating to the possession of civil and worldly goods. No force is here to be
made use of upon any occasion whatsoever. For force belongs wholly to the
civil magistrate, and the possession of all outward goods is subject to his
jurisdiction. But,
it may be asked, by what means then shall ecclesiastical laws be established,
if they must be thus destitute of all compulsive power? I answer: They must
be established by means suitable to the nature of such things, whereof the
external profession and observation--if not proceeding from a thorough
conviction and approbation of the mind--is altogether useless and
unprofitable. The arms by which the members of this society are to be kept
within their duty are exhortations, admonitions, and advices. If by these
means the offenders will not be reclaimed, and the erroneous convinced, there
remains nothing further to be done but that such stubborn and obstinate
persons, who give no ground to hope for their reformation, should be cast out
and separated from the society. This is the last and utmost force of
ecclesiastical authority. No other punishment can thereby be inflicted than
that, the relation ceasing between the body and the member which is cut off.
The person so condemned ceases to be a part of that church. These
things being thus determined, let us inquire, in the next place: How far the
duty of toleration extends, and what is required from everyone by it? And,
first, I hold that no church is bound, by the duty of toleration, to retain
any such person in her bosom as, after admonition, continues obstinately to
offend against the laws of the society. For, these being the condition of
communion and the bond of the society, if the breach of them were permitted
without any animadversion the society would immediately be thereby dissolved.
. . Excommunication neither does, nor can, deprive the excommunicated person
of any of those civil goods that he formerly possessed. . . . Secondly,
no private person has any right in any manner to prejudice another person in
his civil enjoyments because he is of another church or religion. All the
rights and franchises that belong to him as a man, or as a denizen, are
inviolably to be preserved to him. These are not the business of religion. No
violence nor injury is to be offered him, whether he be Christian or Pagan.
Nay, we must not content ourselves with the narrow measures of bare justice;
charity, bounty, and liberality must be added to it. This the Gospel enjoins,
this reason directs, and this that natural fellowship we are born into
requires of us. If any man err from the right way, it is his own misfortune,
no injury to thee; nor therefore art thou to punish him in the things of this
life because thou supposest he will be miserable in that which is to come. What
I say concerning the mutual toleration of private persons differing from one
another in religion, I understand also of particular churches which stand, as
it were, in the same relation to each other as private persons among
themselves: nor has any one of them any manner of jurisdiction over any
other; no, not even when the civil magistrate (as it sometimes happens) comes
to be of this or the other communion. For the civil government can give no
new right to the church, nor the church to the civil government. So that,
whether the magistrate join himself to any church, or separate from it, the
church remains always as it was before--a free and voluntary society. It
neither requires the power of the sword by the magistrate's coming to it, nor
does it lose the right of instruction and excommunication by his going from
it. This is the fundamental and immutable right of a spontaneous
society--that it has power to remove any of its members who transgress the
rules of its institution; but it cannot, by the accession of any new members,
acquire any right of jurisdiction over those that are not joined with it. And
therefore peace, equity, and friendship are always mutually to be observed by
particular churches, in the same manner as by private persons, without any
pretence of superiority or jurisdiction over one another. . . . Nobody,
therefore, in fine, neither single persons nor churches, nay, nor even
commonwealths, have any just title to invade the civil rights and worldly
goods of each other upon pretence of religion. Those that are of another
opinion would do well to consider with themselves how pernicious a seed of
discord and war, how powerful a provocation to endless hatreds, rapines, and
slaughters they thereby furnish unto mankind. No peace and security, no, not
so much as common friendship, can ever be established or preserved amongst
men so long as this opinion prevails, that dominion is founded in grace and
that religion is to be propagated by force of arms.
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