A Vegetarian Philosophy

By Peter Singer

(from Consuming Passions, edited by Sian Griffiths & Jennifer Wallace 1998, pp. 66-72)

Issues  regarding  eating  meat  were  highlighted  in  1997  by  the  longest  trial  in  British  legal history. McDonald’s Corporation and McDonald’s Restaurants Limited v. Steel and Morris, better known as the “McLibel” trial, ran for 515 days and heard 180 witnesses. In suing Helen Steel and David Morris, two activists involved with the London Greenpeace organization, McDonald’s put on trial the way in which its fast-food products are produced, packaged, advertised, and sold, as  well  as  their  nutritional  value,  the  environmental  impact  of  producing  them,  and  the treatment of the animals whose flesh and eggs are made into that food. […]

The case provided a remarkable opportunity for weighing up evidence for and against modern agribusiness   methods.   The   leaflet   “What’s   Wrong   with   McDonald’s”   that   provoked   the defamation  suit  had  a  row  of  McDonald’s  arches  along  the  top  of  each  page.  Two  of  these arches  bore the  words  McMurder  and “McTorture.” One  section below  was  headed  “In  what way are McDonald’s responsible for torture and murder?” The leaflet answered the question as follows:

The menu at McDonald’s is based on meat. They sell millions of burgers every day in 55 countries throughout the world. This means the constant slaughter, day by day, of animals born  and  bred  solely  to  be  turned  into  McDonalds  products.  Some  of  them-especially chickens  and  pigs-spend  their  lives  in  the  entirely  artificial  conditions  of  huge  factory farms, with no access to air or sunshine and no freedom of movement. Their deaths are bloody and barbaric.

McDonald’s claimed that the leaflet meant that the company was responsible for the inhumane torture and murder of cattle, chicken, and pigs, and that this was defamatory. In considering this  claim,  Mr.  Justice  Bell  based  his  judgment  on  what  he  took  to  be  attitudes  that  were generally accepted in Britain. Thus for the epithet “McTorture” to be justified he held, it would not be enough for Steel and Morris to show that animals were under stress or suffered some pain or discomfort:

Merely containing, handling and transporting an animal may cause it stress; and taking it to slaughter certainly may do so. But I do not believe that the ordinary reasonable person believes any of these things to be cruel, provided that the necessary stress, or discomfort or  even  pain  is  kept  to  a  reasonably  acceptable  level.  That  ordinary  person  may  know little  about  the  detail  of  farming  and  slaughtering  methods  but  he  must  had  a  certain amount of stress, discomfort or even pain acceptable and not to be criticised as cruel.

By the end of the trial, however, Mr. Justice Bell found that the stress discomfort, and pain inflicted  on  some  animals  amounted  to  more  than  this  acceptable  level,  and  hence  did constitute a “cruel practice” for which McDonald’s was “culpably responsible.” Chickens, laying hens and sows, he said, kept in individual stalls suffered from “severe restriction of movement” which “is cruel.” He also found a number of other cruel practices in the production of chickens, including the restricted diet fed to breeding birds, which leaves them permanently hungry; the injuries inflicted on chickens by catchers stuffing 600 birds an hour into crates to take them to slaughter; and the failure of the stunning apparatus to ensure that all birds are stunned before they have their throats cut. Judging by entirely conventional moral standards, Mr. Justice Bell held these practices to be cruel, and McDonald’s to be culpably responsible for them.

It was not libelous to describe McDonald’s as “McTorture,” because the charge was substantially true.  What  follows  from  this  judgment  about  the  morality  of  buying  and  eating  intensively raised chickens, pig products that come from the offspring of sows kept in stalls, or eggs laid by hens kept in battery cages? Surely that, too, must be wrong?

This claim has been challenged. At a conference dinner some years ago I found myself sitting opposite a Buddhist philosopher from Thailand. As we helped ourselves to the lavish buffet, I avoided  the  various  forms  of  meat  being  offered,  but  the  Thai  philosopher  did  not.  When  I asked  him  how  he  reconciled  the  dinner  he  had  chosen  with  the  first  precept  of  Buddhism, which tells us to avoid harming sentient beings, he told me that in the Buddhist tradition it is wrong to eat meat only if you have reason to believe that the animal was killed specially for you.  The  meat  he  had  taken,  however,  was  not  from  animals  killed  specially  for  him;  the animals would have died anyway, even if he were a strict vegetarian or had not been in that city at all. Hence, by eating it, he was not harming any animals.

I was unable to convince my dinner companion that this defense of meat eating was better suited to a time when a peasant family might kill an animal especially to have something to put in the begging bowl of a wandering monk than it is to our own era. The flaw in the defense is the  disregard  of  the  link  between  the  meat  I  eat  today  and  the  future  killing  of  animals. Granted,  the  chicken  lying  in  the  supermarket  freezer  today  would  have  died  even  if  I  had never existed; but the fact that I take the chicken from the freezer, and ignore the tofu on a nearby  shelf,  has  something  to  do  with  the  number  of  chickens,  or  blocks  of  tofu,  the supermarket will order next week and thus contributes, in a small way, to the future growth or decline of the chicken and tofu industries. That is what the laws of supply and demand are all about.

Some  defenders  of  a  variant  of  the  ancient  Buddhist  line  may  still  want  to  argue  that  one chicken fewer sold makes no perceptible difference to the chicken producers, and therefore there  can  be  nothing  wrong  with  buying  chicken.  The  division  of  moral  responsibility  in  a situation  of  this  kind  does  raise  some  interesting  issues,  but  it  is  a  fallacy  to  argue  that  a person  can  do  wrong  only  by  making  a  perceptible  harm.  The  Oxford  philosopher  Jonathan Glover has explored the implications of this refusal to accept the divisibility of responsibility in an entertaining article called “It makes no difference whether or not I do it” [Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1975).

Glover  imagines  that  in  a  village,  100  people  are  about  to  eat  lunch.  Each  has  a  bowl containing 100 beans. Suddenly, 100 hungry bandits swoop down on the village. Each bandit takes the contents of the bowl of one villager, eats it, and gallops off. Next week, the bandits plan to do it again, but one of their number is afflicted by doubts about whether it is right to steal from the poor. These doubts are set to rest by another of their number who proposes that each bandit, instead of eating the entire contents of the bowl of one villager, should take one bean  from  every  villager’s  bowl.  Since  the  loss  of  one  bean  cannot  make  a  perceptible difference to any villager, no bandit will have harmed anyone. The bandits follow this plan, each taking a solitary bean from 100 bowls. The villagers are just as hungry as they were the previous week, but the bandits can all sleep well on their full stomachs, knowing that none of them has harmed anyone.

Glover’s example shows the absurdity of denying that we are each responsible for a share of the harms we collectively cause, even if each of us makes no perceptible difference. McDonald’s has  a  far  bigger  impact  on  the  practices  of  the  chicken,  egg,  and  pig  industries  than  any individual consumer; but McDonald’s itself would be powerless if no one ate at its restaurants. Collectively, all consumers of animal products are responsible for the existence of the cruel practices involved in producing them. In the absence of special circumstances, a portion of this responsibility must be attributed to each purchaser.

Without  in  any  way  departing  from  a conventional moral  attitude  toward animals,  then,  we have reached the conclusion that eating intensively produced chicken, battery eggs, and some pig  products  is  wrong.  This  is,  of  course,  well  short  of  an  argument  for  vegetarianism.  Mr. Justice Bell found “cruel practices” only in these areas of McDonald’s food production. But he did not find that McDonald’s beef is “cruelty-free.” He did not consider that question, because he  drew  a  distinction  between  McDonald’s  responsibility  for  practices  in  the  beef  and  dairy industries and those in the chicken, egg, and pig industries. McDonald’s chickens eggs, and pig products  are  supplied  by  a  relatively  small  number  of  very  large  producers,  over  whose practices  the  corporation  could  quite  easily  have  a  major  influence.  On  the  other  hand, McDonald’s beef and dairy requirements came from a very large number of producers; and in respect of whose methods, Mr. Justice Bell held, “there was no evidence from which I could infer that [McDonald’s] would have any effective influence, should it try to exert it.” Whatever one  may  think  of  that  view-it  seems  highly  implausible  to  me-the  judge,  in  accepting  it, decided not to address the evidence presented to him of cruelty in the raising of cattle, so that no conclusions either way can be drawn.

This does not mean that the trial itself had nothing to say about animal suffering in general. McDonald’s called as a witness Mr. David   Walker, chief executive of one of McDonald’s major United Kingdom suppliers, McKey Food Services Ltd. In cross-examination, Helen Steel asked Walker whether it was true that, “as the result of the meat industry, the suffering of animals is inevitable.” Walker replied: “The answer to that must be ‘yes.’ “

Walker’s admission raises a serious question about the ethics of the meat industry: how much suffering are we justified in inflicting on animals in order to turn them into meat, or to use their eggs or milk?

The case for vegetarianism is at its strongest when we see it as a moral protest against our use of animals as mere things, to be exploited for our convenience in whatever way makes them most cheaply available to us. Only the tiniest fraction of the tens of billions of farm animals slaughtered  for  food  each  year—the  figure  for  the  United  States  alone  is  nine  billion—were treated during their lives in ways that respected their interests. Questions about the wrongness of  killing  in  itself  are  not  relevant  to  the  moral  issue  of  eating  meat  or  eggs  from  factory- farmed  animals,  as  most  people  in  developed  countries  do.  Even  when  animals  are  roaming freely over large areas, as sheep and cattle do in Australia, operations like hot-iron branding, castration,  and  dehorning  are  carried  out  without  any  regard  for  the  animals’  capacity  to suffer. The same is true of handling and transport prior to slaughter. In the light of these facts, the issue to focus on is not whether there are some circumstances in which it could be right to eat  meat,  but  on  what  we  can  do  to  avoid  contributing  to  this  immense  amount  of  animal suffering.

The answer is  to boycott all meat and eggs  produced by large scale commercial methods of animal  production,  and  encourage  others  to  do  the  same.  Consideration  for  the  interests  of animals alone is enough justification for this response, but the case is further strengthened by the  environmental  problems  that  the  meat  industry  causes.  Although  Mr.  Justice  Bell  found that the allegations directed at McDonald’s regarding its contribution to the destruction of rain forests were not true, the meat industry as a whole can take little comfort from that, because Bell  accepted  evidence  that  cattle ranching,  particularly  in  Brazil,  had  contributed  to  the clearing of vast areas of rain forest. The problem for David Morris and Helen Steel was that they did not convince the judge that the meat used by McDonald’s came from these regions. So the meat industry as a whole remains culpable for the loss of rain forest and for all the con sequences of that, from global warming to the deaths of indigenous people fighting to defend their way of life.

Environmentalists   are   increasingly   recognizing   that   the   choice   of   what   we   eat   is   an environmental issue. Animals raised in sheds or on feedlots eat grains or soybeans, and they use most of the food value of these products simply in order to maintain basic functions and develop unpalatable parts of the body like bones and skin. To convert eight or nine kilos of grain protein into a single kilo of animal protein wastes land, energy, and water. On a crowded planet with a growing human population, that is a luxury that we are becoming increasingly unable to afford.

Intensive animal production is a heavy user of fossil fuels and a major source of pollution of both air and water. It releases large quantities of methane and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. We are risking unpredictable changes to the climate of our planet—which means, ultimately, the lives of billions of people, not to mention the extinction of untold thousands of species of plants and animals unable to cope with changing conditions—for the sake of more hamburgers. A diet heavy in animal products, catered to by intensive animal production, is a disaster for animals, the environment, and the health of those who eat it.

A Recipe

This recipe is vegan, very simple, nutritious, and tasty. It’s also eaten by hundreds of millions of people every day.

DAL

   2 tablespoons oil

   1 onion, chopped

   2 cloves garlic, crushed

   1 cup dry red lentils

   3 cups water

   bay leaf

   1 cinnamon stick

   1 teaspoon medium curry powder or to taste

   1 14-ounce can of chopped tomatoes or equivalent chopped fresh tomatoes

   2 ounces creamed coconut or half cup coconut milk (optional)

   Juice of lemon (optional)

   Salt to taste

In a deep frying pan, heat the oil and fry the onion and garlic until translucent. Add the lentils and fry them for a minute or two, then add the water, bay leaf, cinnamon stick, and curry powder. Stir, bring to a boil, then let simmer for twenty minutes, adding a little more water from time to time if it gets dry. Add the tomatoes and simmer another ten minutes. By now the lentils should be very soft. Add the creamed coconut or coconut milk and lemon juice, if using, and salt to taste. Remove cinnamon stick and bay leaf before serving.

The final product should flow freely—add more water if it is too thick. It is usually served over rice, with some lime pickle and mango chutney. Sliced banana is another good accompaniment, and so too are pappadams.