The
Debate over Free Will Hard
Determinism Version #1:
Laplace’s Demon: Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749-1827) Given for
one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all forces by which nature
is animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose it …
nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past, would be present to
its eyes. Version #2:
God:
John Calvin (1509-1564) When we
attribute foreknowledge to God, we mean that all things have ever been, and
perpetually remain, before His eyes, so that to His knowledge … all things
are present; … He has determined in Himself what would have become of every
individual of mankind. … Eternal life is foreordained for some, and eternal
damnation for others. 1.
If Laplace’s Demon knows that I will do X
tomorrow, then it is true that I will do X tomorrow 2.
If it is true that I will do X tomorrow, then I
cannot possibly not do X tomorrow 3.
If I cannot possibly not do X tomorrow, then I
am not free to do X tomorrow 4.
\If Laplace’s Demon knows that
I will do X tomorrow, then I am not free to do X tomorrow. Laplace’s
Demon (or Calvin’s God) & the Book of Your Life |
Hard
Determinism and Morality 1.
All events have prior causes 2.
Our actions are events 3.
\Our actions are determined by
the past 4.
If our actions are determined by the past, then
we have no power to act otherwise 5.
If we have no power to act otherwise, then we
can take no free actions 6.
\There are no free actions 7.
If there are no free actions, no one can be held
responsible for what she does or fails to do 8.
\No one can be held
responsible for what she does or fails to do. |
Two
Arguments Against Determinism Determinism
is self-defeating 1.
If determinism is true, no one believes anything
because they have a good reason for believing it 2.
If no one believes anything because they have a
good reason for believing it, no beliefs are rational 3.
\If determinism is true, no
beliefs are rational 4.
\If determinism is true, then
it is not rational to believe that determinism is true Responsibility 1.
If Determinism is true, then we have no free
will 2.
If we have no free will, then we are not
responsible for our actions 3.
We are responsible for our actions 4.
\Determinism is false |
Can
Indeterminism Save Free Will? 1.
Claim: at least some events/actions are simply
uncaused a.
Sub atomic particles b.
Schrodinger’s Cat 2.
Problem: this does not preserve personal
responsibility! |
Soft Determinism (aka Compatibilism) 1. Attempt to
combine a.
All events are caused b.
We are nonetheless free 2. The mugger
& the vagrant 3. Free =
caused by your own will Version #1:
Traditional Compatibilism 1. An action is
free if a.
The action is caused by the will of the agent b.
The action is not forced 2. I am free
(and so, also responsible) if the action is caused by my internal states a.
Desires, b.
beliefs, c.
hopes, 3. Forced
actions are not free actions a.
Key question: could you have done otherwise? b.
Parallel to legal conception of freedom
regarding responsibility Version #2:
Deep Self-Compatibilism 1. Problem with
Traditional Compatibilism a.
Sometimes our desires, wishes, etc. are
different from our will
i.
Addiction
ii.
Brain washing 2. An action is
free if a.
The action is caused by the will of the agent b.
That will is the agent’s authentic will c.
The action
is not forced The
fundamental problem with soft determinism 1.
Having a desire precedes acting on that desire 2.
The desire causes the action 3.
The decision to buy a hot dog at 11:00 am was
causally determined by a desire for a hot dog at 10:59.
i.
How could the actor do other
than decide to buy the hot dog? |
Libertarianism Event Causation vs. Agent
Causation 1.
Agents have Special
Causal Powers Fred the
World Maker 2. Creation of
physical universe is caused by Fred’s action 3. Fred’s
actions were not causally determined by prior events a.
With the
Determinist: actions are caused by agents b.
With the
Indeterminist: agents themselves are not caused to act 4. We’re all a
little bit Fred Advantages 5. #1: We have control over our actions & responsibility for them 6. #2: Agents
have the power to do otherwise Problem 7. Too much
metaphysical baggage a. Agent Causation
i.
Free actions would all have the status of miracles
ii.
Agent causation doesn’t seem to be different
from event causation
iii.
Dualism seems to
need to be assumed 1.
Doesn’t explain the special causal powers 2.
Doesn’t explain how the agent could have done
otherwise b. Agent
i.
Substances
ii.
Agents are fundamental
entities 1. Why
is this so? |